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ABSTRACT

Various aspects of values education and experimental programs in the subject are collected in this annotated bibliography. It is intended to serve as an introduction to the field of moral education and student development during the college years. Forty books are included, but many are anthologies, and all of the major approaches to moral education are presented. The bibliography is divided into three sections. Section A focuses on the major theoretical and empirical findings in moral learning, moral development, and moral education, and many of the citations deal directly with the problem of transforming psychological theory into classroom practice. Section B covers the effects of a college education on student personality and values. Readings in Section C examine the philosophical problems surrounding moral education. All of the references were published between 1960 and 1975. (LBH)

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Moral Education and Student Development During the College Years: A Selective Annotated Bibliography

by

Maurice I. Middleberg

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

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FOREWORD

In June 1975, the Lilly Endowment sponsored a conference of representatives of some twenty colleges and universities at Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, to discuss their responsibility for treating values as part of their educational efforts. In the course of the discussions, it became evident that there was general confusion about the meaning of the term "values." In fact, it was evident that many administrators and faculty members were seriously considering education in the area of values for the first time. It is not surprising, therefore, that often the participants asked for the names of institutions and persons who had already undertaken to clarify the meaning of the term "values" and had actually launched experimental instructional programs to assist students in developing the habit of examining factual learning in terms of its moral, ethical, and humane implications.

Before the conference concluded, it was evident that reperesentatives of these institutions, and doubtless others as well, were eager to lay their hands on readings related to education in the area of values. Accordingly, I assured the participants that the staff of the Program in Liberal Studies, at the University of Arizona, operating under a grant from the Lilly Endowment, would survey the literature in this field and as soon as possible would issue an annotated bibliography of selected items on the subject. To fulfill this promise turned out to be a task more demanding of time and energy than was anticipated. The range and variety of literature on values and related subjects is extensive and of varying quality. Several hundred books, articles, monographs, and reports had to be critically examined, evaluated, and a selected number eventually annotated. This arduous assignment was undertaken by Maurice I. Middleberg of the staff of the Program in Liberal Studies. The resulting selected bibliography presents a list of readings which will be useful to persons who wish to acquaint themselves with the thinking of scholars and administrators who have been doing research and writing on various aspects of values education or taking part in experimental programs in this field. We feel that anyone who peruses these items will have obtained a solid grounding for discussion and reflection on this subject.

Since the concern about what we stand for individually and as a people has become common among all citizens, the main purposes of the bibliography are to acquaint educators and others with the thoughts of those who have attempted to deal systematically with the semantic and definitional intricacies of this subject. Secondly, it is hoped that these readings will stir up discussions in faculties of perhaps the socially most important issues now before academic bodies. This bibliography does not claim to be all inclusive of even the "best" treatments of values in education. Selection inevitably involves value judgments of the selector. The statements expressed about each publication represent the

opinions of the compiler exclusively, and not those either of the Lilly Endowment or the Program in Liberal Studies at the University of Arizona.

The literature on this subject is widely and fugitively scattered through the learned books and journals, as well as other publications. Doubtless, some items of real significance have been missed. The author would like to know from those who use the bibliography of other items that deserve inclusion in any complementary listing that may be undertaken. Descriptions of programs of values education would be especially appreciated. Additional copies of this publication may be secured by addressing the Program in Liberal Studies, The University of Arizona, 1415 North Fremont Ave., Tucson, Arizona 85719.

Earl J. McGrath, Director
Program in Liberal Studies

January 15, 1977

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION vii

SECTION A

Moral Education: Theory and Practice 1

SECTION B

The Impact of College on Students 25

SECTION C

Philosophical Considerations 45

FOOTNOTES 61

INTRODUCTION

This bibliography is intended to serve as a useful introduction to important readings in the field of moral education and student development during the college years. It was written in the belief that we are experiencing a resurgence of interest in the field. However, I think that much of the discussion by academic leaders and faculty is conducted without due consideration of the important theoretical and empirical contributions of psychologists, sociologists, and philosophers. I have attempted to assemble a set of writings which, if read, would provide the basis for intelligent discussion of programs of moral education and student development. I do not claim that the writings contained herein are the "best" which might be found on the subject. I do claim that they are important and useful books.

The list of books contained herein is relatively short, numbering forty in all. However, as many of these books are anthologies, the viewpoints of many more than forty authors are represented. All of the major approaches to moral education have been included. If the reader wishes to explore the topic further, the combined references cited in these forty books provide several thousand books and articles which are available for public consumption.

The bibliography is divided into three sections. Section A focuses on the major theoretical and empirical findings in moral learning, moral development, and moral education. Many of the books deal directly with the problem of transforming psychological theory into classroom practice. It would be best to begin readings in this area with **Moral Education** by K. Purpel and D. Ryan, and Douglas Graham's **Moral Learning and Development**.

Section B focuses on the effects of a college education on student personality and values. One might begin reading in this area with Feldman and Newcomb's **The Impact of College on Students**, and W.G. Perry's **Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development During the College Years**.

Readings in Section C examine the philosophical problems surrounding moral education. One might do well to begin here with the books by John Dewey and Thomas Green, and the anthology edited by Beck, Crittenden and Sullivan.

I wish to express my appreciation to the Lilly Endowment for the grant which made publication of this bibliography possible. A heartfelt thank you is extended to Mary Jo Rubasch who exhibited endless patience in typing and retyping the manuscript. I am also grateful to Earl J. McGrath who inspired the project and provided warm support throughout the work. Above all, I am indebted to my wife, Frances, whose love, warmth, and encouragement sustain all my efforts.

Maurice I. Middleberg
January 5, 1977

SECTION A

MORAL EDUCATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Dreeben, Robert
On What Is Learned in School
Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1968

Mr. Dreeben's work is primarily concerned with the social structure of the elementary and secondary schools but many of his observations are equally germane to the sociopsychological environment of the college.

Mr. Dreeben begins with the premise that the social function of the school is to serve a mechanism for transition from childhood modes of behavior to the norms of behavior which allow one to function in the adult world.

Mr. Dreeben argues that the norms described in the ensuing list are reinforced by the social structure of the school and/or school-related tasks. This list does not exhaust the observations made by Mr. Dreeben but are those most relevant to higher education.

1. *Achievement.* School activities require that the student learn to set goals, complete tasks, accept evaluation by others and postpone gratification. In this way, the school reinforces those attitudes conducive to achievement and accomplishment.
2. *Adaptability.* The increasing heterogeneity of the student body in the higher grades, including college, forces the student to adapt, in some manner, to the norms and deviations of a group larger and more heterogeneous than that encountered in childhood.
3. *Universality.* The young person learns to accept being treated like others in his social group irrespective of personal characteristics. Conversely, the student learns to *categorize* others with respect to characteristics relevant to a particular social situation.
4. *Specificity.* The student learns to relate to others solely in terms of their specific roles or functions. This contrasts with the more holistic relationship which prevails in the family.
5. *Compartmentalization.* The student learns to plan and compartmentalize activities with respect to the strictures of time and priority.

Mr. Dreeben concludes his book with two chapters describing how these norms serve to reinforce attitudes which aid adjustment to the prevailing socioeconomic order.

Graham, Douglas
Moral Learning and Development: Theory and Research
New York: Wiley and Sons, 1972

This is really a splendid introduction to the major theoretical approaches to moral learning and development. Graham demonstrates a wide grasp of the relevant literature. His presentation is clear, lucid and, while not uncritical, quite

evenhanded in its treatment of the various theories.

The first section of Graham's book is devoted to an exploration of the contributions of the psychoanalytic school. Graham spends some time in detailing the mental structures and processes postulated by Freud. Graham also examines the work of a number of later neo-Freudians, including Melanie Klein, Heinz Hartmann, Anna Freud and Erik Erikson. Graham's most valuable contribution in this section is his commentary on the psychoanalytic concept of "identification" which is indistinguishable from what social learning theorists term "modeling" or "imitation." Graham also notes that the psychoanalytic concept of "unconscious guilt" remains a hypothesis which has not been subject to empirical verification.

Graham proceeds on to an accounting of the development of social learning theory. In the first section he describes the theories of some of the earlier, and more extreme, behaviorists. He details Skinner's theory of operant conditioning, Mowrer's introduction of the concept of "vicarious reinforcement," and Eysenck's rather extreme notion that conscience is "a system of generalized conditioned anxiety responses."

In a separate section, Graham examines the more recent work of social learning theorists, such as Bandura and Walters, Aronfreed and Gerwitz. Graham's description of the work of Bandura and Walters is excellent. Graham describes clearly the concepts of modeling, observational learning, vicarious reinforcement, generalization and discrimination which are the major contributions of Bandura and Walters. Graham does offer Gerwitz's critique of Bandura and Walters. Gerwitz contends that imitative behavior is not spontaneous, as claimed by Bandura and Walters, but must be elicited. Graham also discusses Aronfreed's work and his introduction of the concept of "cognitive structures." Aronfreed's theory also distinguishes between "inductive" and "sensitizing" techniques of reinforcement. He found that the former tend to create "cognitive structures" which are distinct from the reinforcing agent.

Graham concludes the discussion of social learning theory with a discussion of L. Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance.

Graham makes the general critique of social learning theorists that their experiments tend to demonstrate only that behavior *can* be modified in a given fashion but not that the development of behavior must, or even usually, does take place in the manner noted under experimental conditions.

Graham follows his discussion of social learning theory with separate chapters on the impact of childhood experiences on moral development and on the development of altruism and sympathy. In the case of early childhood experiences the findings are confused, but what does seem to emerge is that inductive forms of discipline seem to be the most effective in stimulating moral development. Graham's chapter on altruism and sympathy reports the equally confused state of the art on this matter. The research seems to indicate the high

importance of "modeling" behavior in the development of altruism and sympathy.

Before his discussion of Piaget and Kohlberg, Graham provides an overview of other attempts to develop a sequence of development or a typology of moral character. Included in this chapter are brief descriptions of the work of McCord, Kennedy-Frazer, McDougall, Kay, Bull, and Peck and Havighurst. Graham concludes that the common thread in their work is a sequence from amorality to moral autonomy, with varying numbers of intermediate stages.

Graham's discussion of Piaget's theory of moral development is lengthy and comprehensive. He describes Piaget's theory carefully while pointing to the theoretical and methodological flaws in Piaget's work. Graham devotes an entire chapter to research on Piaget's theory.

Graham goes on to describe the work of Kohlberg, including a general critique of cognitive-developmental work. Like Piaget, Kohlberg's work is cited extensively throughout this bibliography.

Graham concludes his book with short discussions of the role of such variables as sex, religion, intelligence, and social class in moral development. Graham also discusses the phenomenon of "amoral" or "conscienceless" individuals.

All in all, this book is the best introduction to the psychology of moral development of which I am aware. I would recommend that the reader follow this book by reading Derek Wright's **The Psychology of Moral Behavior** which discusses a number of specific topics, such as resistance to temptation, and reactions to transgression, in some detail, but does not provide as extensive a background in contemporary theory.

Durkheim, Emile
Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education
New York: Free Press, 1973

Durkheim's work is included in this bibliography both for its historical value as one of the first major sociological treatises on the subject of moral education and as a reminder that the moral education of students does not take place *in vacuo*, but transpires within a wider societal context.

Durkheim's book is a melange of educational sociology and moral philosophy. A brief description of his sociology is in order before we attend to the philosophical problems.

Durkheim postulates that every society establishes goals and customs which serve to enhance the continuation and well-being of the society. That is to say, societies establish *norms* conducive to the collective well-being. To be moral, according to Durkheim, is to adhere to the norms established for the purpose of

enhancing the collective well-being of the society.

Beginning with this premise, Durkheim seeks to establish what he terms "the three elements of morality." The first element, says Durkheim, is discipline. Durkheim contends that conduct which is regular and habitual in a given society tends to be positively evaluated, i.e., habitual conduct is deemed to be moral conduct. This equation of the habitual with the moral is derived by Durkheim from his proposition that societies create and sustain modes of conduct helpful to the larger society. If a mode of conduct is normative to a given society, then the mode of conduct must serve a useful social function. Socially useful conduct is buttressed by the trappings of authority established by the society. To sum up, the first element of morality is discipline, which in turn consists of regularity of conduct and societal authority.

The second element of morality postulated by Durkheim is what he terms "attachment to the social group." Durkheim contends that the endpoint of moral conduct cannot be the individual. Egocentricity is unacceptable and therefore some "higher" end of moral conduct must be established. For Durkheim, the ultimate end of moral conduct is the collective well-being of the society. In order to ensure the well-being of the society, the allegiance of the individual must be transferred from self and family to the larger society.

The third element of morality postulated by Durkheim is autonomy. Durkheim suggests that through the application of reason a "science of morality" may be developed which would reveal the true nature of morality. To be autonomous, contends Durkheim, would be to understand the "science of morality" and conform to its findings.

The latter part of **Moral Education** is essentially a methodological guide. Durkheim suggests how punishment and reward may be utilized to foster both the spirit of discipline and attachment to the social group. He goes on to indicate the role of the sciences in moral reasoning and the more limited role of the arts in moral education.

I cannot help but regard Durkheim's foray into the sociology of education as of dubious merit. I am loathe to comment unduly on the merits of the work as a sociological treatise. I do fear, however, that Durkheim has an unwanted tendency to reify the abstraction of society into a living, breathing, and sacred being. Moreover, the sociology presented implicitly embraces a simplistic behaviorist psychology.

But such qualms as may exist about the sociological merit of the work are far less severe than the enormous philosophical shortcomings. Durkheim has committed what philosophers term "the naturalistic fallacy." Durkheim fails to see what *should* be is not derivable from what *is*. Neither the positive evaluation, nor the regularity nor the sum collective benefit of an action is sufficient to render an act moral. Following Durkheim's reasoning we would be forced to say that slavery, head-hunting and infanticide would all be moral if they served some socially useful purpose. Even if a "science of morality" existed the philosophical validity of the "moral laws" derived from such a science would stand quite apart

from their empirical validity.

Despite my misgivings about Durkheim's work, the historical import of this work makes it worthwhile reading for students of moral education

Duska, Ronald and Mariellen Whelan
Moral Development: A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg
Paramus: Paulist-Newman Press, 1975

Duska and Whelan provide an interesting and informative introduction to cognitive-developmental theory. The book is clearly written and devoid of psychological jargon. As a consequence, some of the subtleties and uncertainties of the theory are missed, but this lucid little book more than compensates by providing an excellent overview of the work of Piaget and Kohlberg.

The book begins with a description of Piaget's theory of moral development. Piaget's studies indicated the existence of two fundamental stages, heteronomy and autonomy. Heteronomy denotes a perception of rules as being immutable and fixed. Autonomous individuals recognize the social origins of rules and judge rules by a standard of reciprocal and equal conduct. Piaget's studies attempted to assess the understanding of children of such concepts as deceit, punishment, authority, and justice as they passed from heteronomy to autonomy. As might be expected, the studies indicated an increasing sophistication of moral judgment as the child grew older.

One of the criticisms I have of this book is that the authors do not comment on the empirical and theoretical limits of Piaget's work. These limits are recognized by many cognitive-developmental theorists.

The second section of the book describes the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg's theory of the development of moral judgment is outlined along with some material on the methodology of Kohlberg's studies. Kohlberg's six developmental stages are full and clearly explained. No further explanation of Kohlberg's work will be attempted here as several references to Kohlberg are included in this bibliography. The reader is encouraged to read Duska and Whelan's description of Kohlberg's theory.

The third section of **Moral Development** consists of an enlightening discussion of Kohlberg's theory as viewed from a Christian perspective. The authors, both Catholics, believe that the Church can serve as a focal point for moral development. For preconventional and conventional stage individuals the Church provides an adequate moral content for the formal structure proposed by Kohlberg. Moreover, the authors argue that the spirit of Vatican II is in harmony with postconventional thought through its welcoming of a free and reasoning approach to the teachings of the Church. This particular section is heartily recommended for those concerned with the role religious education plays in moral education.

The book concludes with a chapter on the educational implications of cognitive-developmental theory. Some basic strategies and principles are suggested for classroom teachers.

Hall, Robert T. and Davis, John V.
Moral Education in Theory and Practice
Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1975

This book by philosopher Hall and psychologist Davis is one of the best introductions to the field of moral education which I have come across. Careful attention is given to the philosophical, psychological, and programmatic dimensions of moral education. However, the book is an introduction to the field of moral education and was intended as such. Some of the points raised in this book require more careful qualification than may be found in this volume.

The first half of the book focuses on the philosophical dimension of moral education. A distinction between indoctrination and education is carefully drawn in the opening section of the book. The distinction is not an analytic one, such as those proposed by Israel Scheffler and Thomas Green, but a functional definition which would serve as a useful guide for the educator. Hall and Davis define indoctrination as the failure to provide equitable consideration of existing alternatives (pg. 39).

The authors then go on to attempt to define the moral domain. This is an area which should be approached by any author with great trepidation. Much of the controversy in the philosophical literature has in recent years centered on the attempt to provide a formal distinction between the moral and nonmoral domains. There is no point in reviewing that controversy in this annotation and I reproduce what Hall and Davis term the "four basic characteristics" of the moral concept. I leave to the reader to judge the adequacy at their definition.

1. A moral judgment is a decision which is, for the person who makes it, a matter of *principle* in that he commits himself to a certain type of action or sincerely recommends it to others.
2. Moral principles and the decisions related to them take *priority* over other motives or reasons for actions.
3. Moral principles are *universal;* they apply impartially to all.
4. A moral perspective may be regarded as the adoption of a framework of personal and social ideals which form a comprehensive view of one's own life and of the society in which one lives (pg. 59).

The substance of the first section of the book consists of an elaboration upon these four characteristics.

The second section of the book examines the principles of psychology which the authors believe need underlie moral education. They provide a description and a useful critique of Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory. Kohlberg's

work is cited throughout this bibliography and is essential to any consideration of moral education.

The authors also draw upon the writings of Carl Rogers, principally from Rogers' **Freedom to Learn**. The authors reemphasize Rogers' contention that part of the process of values development is the development of the capacity to accurately perceive one's own needs, beliefs and characteristics, and the ability to accurately perceive the nature of one's environment. To facilitate this process of growing awareness the educator need provide an empathetic and sympathetic awareness of the student's perceptions of self and others. Hall and Davis suggest some of the skills, such as active listening, which the instructor can develop to facilitate the realization of self-awareness.

The third section of **Moral Education in Theory and Practice** provides some excellent guidelines for programs of moral education. They describe in some detail the applications of the case study method. A large number of hypothetical dilemnas have been developed by Kohlberg's colleagues for use as case studies.[1]

The authors also discuss the role of the humanities and the social sciences, the role of classroom analysis of moral concepts, games and classroom simulations or moral conflict situations.

I recommend this book as an introduction to the latest developments in the field of moral education.

Kay, A William
Moral Development
New York; Schocken Books, 1968

Mr. Kay's book might aptly be titled "Moral Development: A Catalogue of Theories." Mr. Kay wends his way through the findings of innumerable authors. Mr. Kay attempts to demonstrate that parallel patterns of personality development exist, each of which affect moral development. Kay examines each of these patterns separately.

In the first instance, he examines what he terms "the simple stages of development," citing the work of Bompas Smith, Beatrice Swainson and Arnold Gesell. Herein he outlines the basic patterns of human relations. According to the research cited by Kay, the normal pattern of development is from egocentricity, to reliance on parental approval, followed by a shift in loyalty from parents to the peer group and finally a move away from the peer group towards allegiance to independent principles.

The second element of morality, according to Kay, is the nature of the sanctions to which individuals respond. At an early age, the child is motivated by egocentric and prudential considerations. If development proceeds normally, the individual will become more sensitive to the sanctions imposed by the wider society. That is, he will respond to the authority of the social order rather than

to mere prudential concerns. In the final stage the individual responds to autonomously derived principles.

The third element is the development of moral judgment. Kay cites the work of Durkheim, Piaget and Kohlberg, among others. The work of these three authors is cited extensively in this bibliography and will not be explored here.

The fourth element of morality examined by Kay is the pattern of general psychosocial development. Kay relies on the work of Peck and Havighurst in his exploration of this topic.

Kay concludes this book with an attempt to integrate the many theories he reviews in his book and to subsume within a model of his own devising.

In my view the value of this book lies in its extensive review of the various theoretical approaches to moral development. Kay is insufficiently critical of the the theories he cites and ignores much conflicting evidence. Moreover, Kay's attempt to mold so many divergent approaches to moral development strains the boundaries of both logic and empirical evidence.

Kohlberg, Lawrence
"Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development Revisited." Available from Moral Education and Research Foundation, Harvard University. 1975

I have included this article by Kohlberg as it has particular bearing upon the moral development of college students. The article focuses on the transition from adolescence to moral adulthood. Put in terms of cognitive-developmental theory, Kohlberg attempts to trace the process of transition from conventional to postconventional moral thought. The article has another interesting facet in that it is indicative of the modifications of theory and methodology which have sporadically marked Kohlberg's work.

Kohlberg begins with an attempt to place moral development in juxtaposition with Piaget's theory of intellectual development. Assuming "normal" development, adolescence and early adulthood is marked by a transition from concrete operational to formal operational thought. Adulthood is characterized by the "horizontal decalage" and stabilization of formal operational thought. That is to say that intellectual maturation in adulthood takes place through the spread of formal operational thought from one area of intellectual activity to another and an increasing tendency to reject lower stage thought.

Kohlberg contends that the decalage and stabilization of formal operational thought is a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for the development of postconventional moral thought. The capacity for formal thought permits the presocietal perspective necessary for postconventional moral thought.

Late adolescence and early adulthood is marked, then, by a transition from conventional to postconventional thought under conditions of normal development. At the end of the high school years individuals are "normally" at Stage 4, which may take one of two forms. Stage 4A is marked by adherence to the law as the supreme arbiter of morality. Stage 4B is characterized by a placing of highest value on the preservation of the society, which may at times transcend any particular law.

Under optimum conditions the years following high school see the advent of a "transition phase" from conventional to postconventional thought. The transitional phase, labeled Stage 4½ by Kohlberg is often characterized by thought which appears to be hedonistic or amoral in orientation. However, the dynamic is more complex than simple retrogression to Stage 2 type thought. Stage 4½ individuals have transcended conventional and stereotypic thought. The normative mores of the society no longer hold any intrinsic value for these individuals. At the same time, they have failed to establish an independent framework of moral principles and thus are left in a moral void. Kohlberg has not found any individual to establish clear Stage 5 thought under the age of twenty-three.

The advent of the transition phase is often spurred by the individual's entrance into college. The college culture is often characterized by conflicting values and life-styles, the presence of which serves to undermine the surety of Stage 4 thought. This dynamic of movement from rigidity of thought to a rather extreme relativism, and finally to an independent set of principles is familiar to many educators and has been described in some detail by Perry (1970)[2]. Kohlberg indicates that none of the subjects of his longitudinal study who did not attend college developed principled thinking. Moreover, Kohlberg cites studies by Blatt (1973)[3] and Boyd (1973)[4] which reported on classroom attempts to stimulate stage transition. Blatt was unsuccessful in moving any high school Stage 4's to Stage 5. However, Boyd was successful in stimulating transition from Stage 4 to Stage 5 in 40 percent of the college freshman and sophomore subjects in his study.

Kohlberg also argues that his theory of moral development is congruent with Erikson's theory of psychosocial development. The "identity crisis" postulated by Erikson is loosely tied to the onset of the transition phase (Stage 4½) of moral development. Kohlberg, citing research by Podd (1968)[5], argues that the resolution of the identity crises is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the development of principled thought.

This is an important essay by Kohlberg for college educators as it describes some of the important developmental tasks faced by college students.

Kohlberg, Lawrence
"Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization"
From: **Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research**, D. Goslin, editor.
New York: Rand McNally and Co., 1969

Lawrence Kohlberg has reported some very exciting and interesting findings in the psychology of moral development. Kohlberg's theory of moral development has its roots in the work of Jean Piaget and John Dewey. As the title of this chapter indicates, Kohlberg's theory is based upon the Piagetan concept of the existence of distinctive, sequential modes of thought. The process of development is seen as age related, though, like Piaget, Kohlberg does not claim that progression through the developmental hierarchy is inevitable.

Kohlberg's fundamental contention is that there are six stages of moral judgment. The stages are culturally universal, invariant in sequence and highly stable. Each stage represents a "structured" mode of thought. More explicitly, the theory states that there are a number of culturally universal components (e.g., punishment, authority, rules) of the moral decision-making process and that there are six distinct, universal, sequential modes of conceptualizing the role and priority of each of these components.

Transition from stage to stage is not maturational but rather interactional in origin. That is to say, as the individual's cognitive powers develop each lower moral stage reveals both logical and social inadequacies which are resolved by movement to the next stage. The impetus for stage transition appears to be the existence of cognitive conflict, i.e., the existence of a personal moral dilemma for which the existing mode of thought is *both* logically and functionally inadequate and for which higher stage thought provides resolution. As one might expect from such a theory the rate and terminus of development are correlated with intelligence and early opportunities for role-taking.

Kohlberg's work provides some intriguing implications for higher education. For one thing, he strongly disagrees with the position that moral values are fixed in early childhood and that moral development cannot take place during early childhood. Studies by him and Kramer (1969,[6] 1975) indicate that development can and does take place from the mid teens through the mid-twenties.

Secondly, Kohlberg stresses the cognitive element of moral behavior. He does not, of course, contend that moral behavior is dependent upon the sophistication of one's philosophical analysis or upon "pure" reason. However, he does claim that moral behavior is related to the pattern of reasoning and that the pattern is amenable to change under the proper circumstances.

Thirdly, work by E. Turiel (1973)[7] indicates that late adolescence and early adulthood are marked by the type of cognitive conflict which spurs moral development as childhood modes of behavioral response become increasingly

inadequate. Thus the college years present an excellent opportunity in the course of the lifespan to accelerate maturation and development. It is noteworthy that Kohlberg's theory closely parallels that of W.G. Perry (1970). In each case the normative pattern of development is away from reliance on external authority as the sole source of "truth" and towards the internalization of independently derived ethical principles.

There have been a number of short-term classroom experiments which sought to stimulate development of moral judgment in accordance with Kohlberg's theory. The results have been mixed at best and more work needs to be done in this area.

I strongly recommend that individuals interested in the development of moral judgment during the college years become familiar with Kohlberg's work. A complete bibliography of his writings may be obtained from the Center for Moral Education, Harvard University.

Articles by a number of the more prominent critics of Kohlberg's work have been included in this bibliography, including Justin Aronfreed, R.S. Peters, and Elizabeth Simpson. I list below several other well-known critiques of Kohlberg's work.

Alston, William P. "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is To Ought,'" in **Cognitive Development and Epistemology**, T. Mischel (ed.), New York: Academic Press, 1971, pp. 269-285.

Kurtines, W. and E.B. Grief. "The Development of Moral Thought: Review and Evaluation of Kohlberg's Approach," **Psychological Bulletin**, 1974, 81: 453-470.

Simpson Elizabeth L. "Moral Development Research: A Case Study of Scientific Cultural Bias," **Human Development**, 1974, 17:81-106.

Lickona, Thomas (ed.)
Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues
New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976

This very useful, four-part volume presents an excellent collection of essays on the psychology of moral behavior.

The first section of the book consists of a rather lengthy essay by T. Lickona in which he attempts to identify the major theoretical issues and conflicts in the study of moral psychology.

The second section consists of eight essays, each representing different theoretical viewpoints on the nature of moral psychology. L. Kohlberg's essay is drawn from his cognitive-developmental theory of moralization. Justin Aronfreed, like Walter and Harriett Mischel in their separate essay, criticizes Kohlberg's work and proposes a variant of social learning theory as a more

adequate explanation of moral development. Elizabeth Simpson also takes Kohlberg to task, arguing that Kohlberg has failed to take into account a wide array of human needs, such as those defined by Maslow (1954)[8], whose fulfillment is a necessary complement and antecedent to moral behavior. James Gilligan presents a theory of morality and moral development which is drawn from the psychoanalytic tradition. H.J. Eysenck, who is of the behaviorist school of psychology ("conscience is a conditioned reflex," p. 109), defends the more extreme behaviorist approach. Martin L. Hoffman devotes his article to consideration of the development of empathy and altruism. Urie Bronfenbrenner and James Garbaranco coauthor an article in which they attempt to reconcile Bronfenbrenner's typology of moral judgment with Kohlberg's developmental theory.

The third section of **Moral Development and Behavior** reports research on a variety of special topics. Subjects of the articles include the development of honesty, the assessment of moral judgment, and research on Piaget's theory of moral development. There are five separate articles in this section. I do not review them here at any great length as they may be too limited in scope to be of interest to the general reader.

The fourth and final section of **Moral Development and Behavior** is more directly concerned with specific social issues. Ted Huston and Chuck Korte examine the nature of individuals who intervene positively in an emergency. Robert Liebert and Rita Poulous look at the potential for television to serve as an agent for moral education. Robert Selman examines the implications of cognitive-developmental theory for educational and clinical practice. James Mancusco and Theodore Sarbin offer an analysis of the psychological and legal definitions of morality, psychopathology and culpability. Alan Lockwood's essay deals with the relationship between moral and political reasoning. Gilbert Geis and John Monahan explore the social reinforcements and definitions of violence. Geis and Monahan point to the legal and societal distinction between acts of violence by individuals and corporate violence.

It is recommended that **Moral Development and Behavior** be read in conjunction with **Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches** which provides a more philosophical perspective on moral education.

Meyer, John, Brian Burnham, and John Cholvat
Values Education: Theory/Practice/Problems/Prospects
Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1975

This collection of essays had its inception at an invitational conference on values education held in Ontario, Canada, in early 1975. The essays are of mixed quality but serve well to highlight some of the issues and controversies

surrounding values education. Another important feature of this anthology is that some of the more well-known figures in the field of values education have contributed essays, each representing a separate approach to values education.

The cognitive-developmentalists are well represented by Lawrence Kohlberg, Edwin Fenton, John Gibbs, James Rest, Robert Selman, and John Stewart.

Fenton provides a most illuminating essay describing the implications of recent research in moral development for civic education as well as indicating why earlier attempts at civic education have failed. Gibbs reviews the research supporting the cognitive-developmental approach to moral development. It must be said that Gibb's essay is one-sided with little attention given to the substance of critiques of the cognitive-developmental approach. Kohlberg provides a critique of the values clarification approach to values education, contending that it fails to address the need for rational, objective moral principles as a guide to conduct. James Rest takes up the cudgels in defense of the Defining Issues Test, which he has developed, contending that the D.I.T. is an adequate mode of assessing the stage of moral reasoning. Robert Selman presents an essay describing social perspective-taking stages in terms of structural-developmental theory and the educational implications of such a theory. Selman's writings are invariably carefully written and well-balanced and should not be ignored by any student of moral development. J. Stewart contends, in his essay, that Kohlberg's work demonstrates that moral development will occur only when the school is a just community. Stewart's essay highlights the important role which the social structure of educational institutions plays in the moral development of the student.

Milton Rokeach offers a critique of the values clarification approach in his essay. Rokeach contends that the "value-neutrality" supposed by the proponents of values clarification is a myth. Rokeach argues that certain values, such as broadmindedness, logical consistency, and independence of thought, are necessary to any educational venture, including values clarification. Rokeach argues for two kinds of values education. First, a deliberate support and inculcation of values which are prerequisite to education. Second, the consideration of substantive value issues.

Two other articles of value are those by Howard Kirschenbaum and John Meyer. Kirschenbaum presents a review of recent research on the values clarification approach. Meyer offers a useful catalogue of centers of research in values education in the United States and Canada.

Other authors of essays in this anthology are Rodney Allen, William Damon, Richard Hersh with Marcia Mutterer, Robert Litke, Michael Silver, and John Wilson.

Pagliuso, Susan
Understanding Stages of Moral Development: A Programmed Learning Workbook
New York: Paulist Press, 1976

One of the criticisms which has been directed at Lawrence Kohlberg has been been that he has failed to publish a complete account of his assessment methodology. Part of the reason for this may be that Kohlberg has been continuously refining the instrument. For reports on recent refinements of the methodology the interested reader should consult Kohlberg's essay in **Moral Development and Behavior** (T. Lickona, ed.)[9] and the September 1976 issue of the **Moral Education Forum**.

Susan Pagliuso helps to fill the gap in the literature with this workbook. Pagliuso carefully details the structure of each stage. It is important to understand that each stage is made of up disparate "aspects." Each aspect is a moral issue such as the value of life, the role of law, or the function of sanctions. At each stage there are typical responses to teach aspect. The scoring of the aspects of the individual's response forms the basis for global stage assignment.

Pagliuso's book provides a good introductory guide to aspect scoring. In addition to providing sample stage responses, she provides 15 complete moral judgment interviews for practice scoring. The book is somewhat tedious to work through, but well worth the effort. My other criticism of the book is that the distinctions between the stages often appear to be rather strained. I reiterate my earlier caution that the stage descriptions should be read in the context of recent refinements by Kohlberg. Kohlberg's latest scoring manual is available from the Moral Education Center at Harvard University.

Purpel, David and Kevin Ryan (eds.)
Moral Education . . . It Comes with the Territory
Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Co., 1976

Purpel and Ryan provide us with a superb overview of the major issues and controversies of moral education. The book presents almost no new material; most of the chapters are reprints of articles or selections from other books. What the book lacks in originality, however, is more than compensated for by the generally excellent quality and intelligent organization of the selections contained in this volume.

Part I of **Moral Education** attempts to establish a philosophical and cultural

framework for the rest of the book. Purpel and Ryan, in their two essays, point out that surveys have shown that moral education is a major concern of parents and educators alike. Moreover, they argue that moral education is intrinsic to the educational process and that the issue must be faced squarely by teachers and administrators. James Watkins, in his article, describes briefly the major metaethical theories and the major approaches to moral education. Watkins suggests that to select any metaethical framework logically entails choosing the appropriate educational methodology, i.e., one's choice among educational programs is largely predetermined by one's ethical assumptions.

Israel Scheffler, in his essay, finds that the quality of *reasonableness* (i.e., the spirit of critical inquiry) is a common element which binds together moral, scientific, and democratic education. Scheffler goes on to argue that moral education cannot be taught outside of some substantive curricular and environmental context.

William Connell offers an interesting essay comparing methods of moral education in China, the U.S.S.R., England, and the United States.

Part II of **Moral Education** focuses entirely on the values clarification approach pioneered by Louis Raths and Sidney Simon. Values clarification has attracted a considerable degree of attention over the past ten years. Part II provides an overview of the values clarification approach as well as some excellent critiques of the concept.

Part II opens with a lengthy excerpt from **Values and Teaching** which is annotated elsewhere in this bibliography. The excerpt is followed by an essay by Howard Kirschenbaum who attempts to refute some of the major criticisms which have been directed against values clarification. Sidney Simon follows with an essay in which he extols the virtue of values clarification as a nonindoctrinative approach to values education. My own feeling is that Simon's argument would be immensely abetted by a more careful and analytic distinction between indoctrination and education.

Simon's article is followed by two critiques of the values clarification approach, one by James Stewart and the other by Alan Lockwood. Both are excellent, though they differ in tone and substance.

Part III focuses on the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education pioneered by Lawrence Kohlberg. Part III begins with two essays by Kohlberg. In the first, he presents a lucid, nontechnical overview of the theory and its implications for moral education. In the second essay Kohlberg discusses the impact of the "hidden curriculum" and the implications of cognitive-developmental theory for the social structure of the school.

Edmund Sullivan and Clive Beck follow Kohlberg's essays with a description of their attempts to implement Kohlberg's theory with Canadian elementary and secondary students. They report mixed results which may be accounted for by differing school settings and classroom techniques. Ralph Mosher and Edmund Sullivan, in a separate article, report on a program of moral education for high school students in which they attempted to weave together a variety of

educational experiences, including discussion of Kohlberg's moral dilemma and teaching and counseling of younger students by the high school subjects. Mosher and Sullivan report significant student development as measured by Kohlberg's Moral Maturity Scale and the Loevinger-Wessler Ego Development Test.

James Rest contributes an excellent article in which he reviews the major tenets of cognitive-developmental theory and a number of major attempts to implement the theory in educational programs. Rest has contributed a number of excellent articles to the literature and his writings are worth close examination. Rest has developed a paper and pencil test, called the Defining Issues Test, for assessing the stage of moral judgement.

An article by Ann Colby contrasts values clarification and moral development and indicates some areas where the two approaches might be usefully integrated.

R.S. Peters offers a short critique of Kohlberg's work. Jack Fraenkel completes Part III with a lengthy critique of Kohlberg's work. I think that Fraenkel's critique of the educational programs which Kohlberg's work has spawned is more valuable than his critique of cognitive-developmental theory.

Part IV of **Moral Education** focuses on the cognitivist approach to moral education. Cognitivism is the oldest form of moral education and consists of the intellectual analysis of normative and metaethical issues. Michael Scriven begins Part IV with a defense of the cognitive position. Scriven claims that values clarification argues for an extreme moral relativism, affective education for irrationality and aimlessness and cognitive-developmental theory for thinly veiled authoritarianism. The flaw in Scriven's position, of course, is that he offers no way to translate vacuous verbalisms into moral belief and moral behavior.

Gary Wehlage and Alan Lockwood argue in their article that moral relativism is an inadequate basis for moral education. Wehlage and Lockwood contend that any program of moral education must distinguish between moral and nonmoral values and meet certain criteria of moral discourse such as consistency and generalizability. Wehlage and Lockwood criticize a number of approaches to moral education on the basis of these two criteria.

Mary Jo Bane and Donald Oliver describe a program of moral education conducted with the framework of a high school social studies program. While they feel their program has merit, they doubt that the emphasis on intellectual skills in their program will significantly affect moral behavior.

Irving Kristol concludes Part IV with an article which is reviewed in this bibliography in the annotation of **Moral Development: Proceedings of the 1974 ETS Invitational Conference**.

Purpel and Ryan bring the volume to a close with a postscript, some interesting survey data, and a short selective bibliography.

I am most impressed by this volume. If the reader would combine this book with Douglas Graham's **Moral Learning and Development**, he would have a marvelous introduction to the field and would be competent to pursue more advanced literature in the field.

Raths, Louis, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon
Values and Teaching
Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1966

This volume launched the values clarification approach to values education. Values clarification has attracted wide interest in the past ten years and stands as the major theoretical alternative to the cognitive-developmental approach.

The fundamental premise of the authors is that young people are faced with a vast and bewildering array of alternatives, as they attempt to establish a worldview and a life-style. The essence of the values clarification approach is to help students establish a rational process for choosing among alternative values. The emphasis of the values clarification approach is on the process of valuing rather than the transmission of particular values.

The process of valuing has, according to the authors, three basic components. The first is choice. Values must be chosen freely, after due consideration of alternatives and after examining the consequences of the choice.

The second component of valuing is prizing, the affirmation of one's choice both in one's own mind and in the public eye.

The third component of valuing is action; the willingness to act repeatedly in a manner consistent with the expressed value choice.

The authors also offer extensive guidelines to the teacher in using the values clarification approach. The goals, aspirations, attitudes, beliefs, and problems of the student are worth exploring as values are often borne of such "value indicators." They further suggest a number of topics such as sex, money, friendship, religion, and politics as areas to which the values clarification approach might be fruitfully applied. The authors also suggest responses to statements of values by students. The responses are designed to help the student think carefully about the choice he or she is making.

The book offers an extensive assortment of techniques for classroom and individual conference use. A useful collection of classroom techniques may be found in **Values Clarification** by Sidney Simon, Leland Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum (New York: Hart, 1972).

Values clarification has been widely used but has been subject to some severe criticisms. On the one hand, single-minded emphasis on student choice does not allow for dissuasion from extremely repugnant moral decisions. One might, for example, freely, happily, and with due consideration of the consequences, choose to be a thief. On the other hand, the specific techniques and processes described by the authors implicitly embody a large number of values, including tolerance, independence, and assumption of responsibility. These implicit value commitments fly in the face of the authors' claim for a "value-free" process. Moreover, the values clarification approach has not been tied to a firm theoretical basis.

Despite these misgivings, I would urge the reader to explore the values clarification approach as I believe it might be usefully integrated with other approaches to moral education.

Rokeach, Milton
The Nature of Human Values
New York: Free Press, 1973

Professor Rokeach's work presents a most interesting account of various applications of the Rokeach Value Survey and the theoretical implications of his findings.

Dr. Rokeach postulates the existence of two fundamental types of values which he terms instrumental values and terminal values. Instrumental values are essentially values relating to a mode of conduct. Courage, ambition, honesty and independence are examples of instrumental values. Terminal values, such as "salvation," "wisdom," "equality," and "freedom" refer to end-states of existence. The 18 instrumental and 18 terminal values contained in the value survey were distilled from earlier, longer lists of personality trait words.

Rokeach and his associates administered the Value Survey to a wide variety of individuals of diverse backgrounds. His findings indicate relationships between values, as measured by the Value Survey, and such variables as socioeconomic status, occupational status, religious affiliation, age, sex, race, and educational level. Further studies explore the relationship between values and attitudes towards specific social and political issues. It should be noted that Rokeach distinguishes between attitudes and values, contending that values are beliefs which are antecedent to attitude formation.

Rokeach also advances in his text a "two-value model of political ideology." His basic contention is that the political ideology to which an individual adheres is a function of the priority the individual places upon the values of equality and freedom. Rokeach presents a number of studies in support of his hypothesis.

The most interesting theoretical contribution of the text is Dr. Rokeach's theory of value change. Dr. Rokeach's theory is derived from cognitive dissonance theory with an important difference. Traditional dissonance theory attributes value and attitude change to conflicting cognitions. Dr. Rokeach contends that value change occurs only when a given cognition is in conflict with the individual's self-concept. Rokeach's experiments with Michigan college students, wherein he attempted to induce long-term value and attitude change, are cited in support of his theory of value change. This set of experiments is also used to support Rokeach's contention that values precede and modify behavior.

Rokeach concludes his text with an analysis of the practical, methodological, theoretical, and ethical implications of his findings.

Sullivan, Edmund V.
Moral Learning: Findings, Issues and Questions
New York: Paulist Press, 1975

Moral Learning provides one of the few book-length reports on attempts to implement Kohlberg's theory of moral development in an educational setting. **Moral Learning** serves two valuable purposes. First, it demonstrates that attempts to stimulate stage transition have met with mixed results, if not failure. Second, that a good deal of contradictory evidence surrounds cognitive-developmental theory.

Sullivan reviews Kohlberg's theory and describes the normative data reported by Kohlberg. In addition, he reports on findings by Sullivan, et al (1970)[10], on developmental patterns in Canadian youth.

Sullivan describes experimental attempts to stimulate moral development in both the elementary and secondary schools. I will not give any attention to the experiments conducted with elementary school students as they are really beyond the boundaries of the concerns of this bibliography. The experiments at the high school level are of great interest, however, as they attempted to stimulate development from conventional to postconventional thought.

The experiments were carried out at two Canadian secondary schools, Campbell and Springdale Collegiate. The students at Campbell were in a college preparatory curriculum. The Springdale students did not expect to attend college.

The Campbell students participated in a group discussion meeting twice weekly over a period of four months. The topics of discussion may be found in **Moral Learning**. Suffice to say here that they focused on the nature and role of moral goodness, motives, and principles.

The results of the Campbell experiment were mixed. On the post-test the students did not demonstrate any significant increase in postconventional reasoning. However, in a follow-up test given a year after the conclusion of the class, a significant increase in postconventional thought was noted. These results indicate the possibility that the experimental class had a "sleeper" effect on the students.

The Springdale students also participated in a discussion group. However, the content and format of the class was more structured and traditional, both in content and format, than that of the Campbell class. No significant increase in postconventional thought was noted in either the post-test or the follow-up test.

Sullivan cites several reasons for the very limited success of these attempts to stimulate moral development. These include the teacher-centered format of the classes, and the conventional and authoritarian structure of the schools. Some problems which Sullivan does not consider include the possibility of assessment error and, more importantly, Kohlberg's contention that postconventional moral moral thought does not emerge until early adulthood.[11] Furthermore, despite

the claim that the classes were based on Kohlberg's theory neither class used the case-conflict method advocated by Kohlberg.

Another facet of **Moral Learning** is a chapter on teacher education. Sullivan describes an in-service workshop on moral education held for practicing teachers. Sullivan also reports on attempts by the participants in the workshop to implement their new knowledge.

The book concludes with an excellent chapter on the problem of indoctrination, including a critique of the form vs. content dichotomy postulated by Kohlberg.

Wright, Derek
The Psychology of Moral Behavior
Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1971

Wright sets as the purpose of this book the introduction of the reader to the psychological study of moral behavior. Mr. Wright does succeed in providing us with a very useful primer in moral psychology.

Wright begins his foray into the field with an opening chapter in which he describes briefly the major theoretical perspectives on moral development. There are four major schools of thought on moral development: the social group approach, the Freudian or neo-Freudian psychoanalytic tradition, the social learning theory approach and the cognitive-developmental school. Wright treats each of these approaches evenhandedly. However, the reader who begins his exploration into the field with Wright's book should be aware that most recent research has focused on cognitive-developmental theory and that the major controversy has been between the proponents of social learning theory and the proponents of cognitive-developmental theory.[12]

The bulk of the remainder of this book is given to an examination of the major issues associated in light of empirical findings and the perspectives offered by each of the major schools. A chapter is devoted to each of the following five major topics. First, *resistance to temptation* by which Wright means the capacity of individuals to refrain from commission of acts which they believe to be wrong. Second, Wright offers a treatment of the factors which are associated with *juvenile delinquency*. Third, Wright provides an examination of the way in which people react to knowledge of their own transgressions. This chapter on *posttransgressional reactions* offers an interesting insight into phenomena such as guilt and the minimization of cognitive dissonance. Fourth, the psychology of *moral reasoning* is examined through a discussion of the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. Fifth, Wright draws upon the research of individuals such as Rokeach, Morris, and Allport in his discussion of the role which belief systems play in the total personality.

Following this rather extensive review of the research, Wright proposes a character typology. By his own admission, the typology is highly speculative. Though there may be some intuitive merit to the typology, it lacks an empirical base.

Wright concludes his book with a short essay on the role of religion and education in moral development.

SECTION B

THE IMPACT OF COLLEGE ON STUDENTS

Chickering, Arthur W.
Commuting Versus Resident Students
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975

Mr. Chickering begins his latest book by noting some of the effects and impacts of mass higher education. The "new students" vary widely in their educational experiences and aptitudes. Many are first generation college students, and come from the less affluent sectors of society. Their perceptions of the college experience and their purposes in going to college differ from that of the traditional student.

Mr. Chickering's intent is to describe one attendant consequence of the diversification of American higher education; the differing impact of residential colleges, which are more likely to be attended by the traditional middle and upper class students, and the commuter colleges, which attract the bulk of the "new students."

Mr. Chickering's study, undertaken in cooperation with A.C.E., indicates that, aside from the socioeconomic differences marking the two groups, commuter students enter less selective colleges, and have a general pattern of lower high school academic achievement and extracurricular involvement. Commuter students are more vocationally oriented in their educational goals and more conservative politically and socially.

The outcomes and experiences of the two groups vary as markedly, and along the same lines, as their initial positions. The commuter students are handicapped due to their retaining limited educational goals. The handicaps of the commuter students are accentuated by their continuing immersion in the home, which lessens the potential, relative to the resident students, for involvement with a new referent group which values the intellectual and social preoccupations of the college.

The result of the variance in backgrounds is that students who live at home become less involved in academic and extracurricular affairs, report greater dissatisfaction with college and remain more conservative politically and socially. Commuter students also have lower educational aspirations, report less positive development and smaller and less pronounced sets of personal competencies. An interesting anomaly to this general picture is that no significant differences were reported in the grade point averages of the two groups.

As remedies to the problem of the lessened impact of college on commuter students, Mr. Chickering makes two basic proposals, drawing in many instances upon his experience at Empire State College. His first recommendation is that colleges attended by commuter students seek to structure the environment to fit the learning styles and needs of the students.

Secondly, Chickering describes a number of specific instructional methodologies and support facilities (e.g., programmed learning, contract learning, development of a learning resource directory) which can be of use in meeting the needs of a diverse student population.

Chickering, Arthur W.
Education and Identity
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969

Mr. Chickering's book, winner of the 1969 ACE book award, provides us with a lucid, stimulating and informative analysis of the educational potential of the undergraduate experience.

Chickering suggests seven potential lines or "vectors" of student development. For purposes of this synopsis, I have provided below brief definitions of the seven developmental vectors postulated by Chickering.

1. *Achieving Competence.* Chickering suggests that students strive for three types of competence: intellectual competence, manual or physical competence, and interpersonal competence. By interpersonal competence, Chickering means the ability to work successfully with others towards the attainment of commonly valued goals.
2. *Managing Emotions.* Chickering speaks of late adolescence and early adulthood as a period wherein the young learn to come to terms with their sexual and aggressive impulses. Maturation requires both an increasing awareness of their own impulses and feelings and the ability to integrate, in some productive manner, emotion and behavior.
3. *Developing Autonomy.* There are three phases to the development of automony. First, the development of emotional independence, which means the ability to disengage oneself from the need for continuous approval from parents, authority figures, or peers and the ability to rely on one's own reservoir of confidence and psychic strength. Second, the development of instrumental independence, which is closely allied to the development of competence. By instrumental independence is meant the ability to accomplish tasks on one's own and the capacity for mobility. Lastly, the development of autonomy requires the recognition of interdependence. To be autonomous means also to recognize that one's emotional and physical well-being is often dependent upon the strength of one's relationships with fellow human beings.
4. *Freeing Interpersonal Relationships.* This phase of development involves freeing oneself from stereotyping and unwarranted prejudices, accompanied by an increased tolerance for differing life-styles and values. This phase of development is also marked by the capacity for greater intimacy in close personal relationships. Relationships become stronger and more enduring and do not require reassurance in order to survive.
5. *Developing Purpose.* This fifth line of development involves the establishment of avocational and recreational interests, vocational plans and aspirations and the creation of a suitable life-style.
6. *Developing Integrity.* By developing integrity, Chickering means the establishing of a coherent and consistent value system. He suggests that the

development of integrity takes place in two steps. The first involves what Chickering terms "the humanizing of values," by which he means the reconceptualization of moral or social rules in terms of the social purposes which the rules were designed to serve rather than the literal application of rules. However, the move from absolutism to a more relativistic position creates the danger of a total loss of legitimate grounds upon which to construct a value-system. The second step in the development of integrity involves what Chickering calls "personalizing values." To personalize values is to establish an internalized value system which is firm and consistent, while at the same time avoiding a return to absolutism and authoritarianism. Moreover, to personalize values is both to clearly recognize one's own values and to reflect one's values in one's behavior.

7. *Establishing Identity*. Chickering's chapter on this topic lacks the clarity which marks the rest of the book. Perhaps because the other developmental vectors are so exhaustive, little remains to be covered in this topic. Chickering does, however, try to give us the sense of the integration of the various vectors which are necessary for the establishment of identity.

The second part of **Education and Identity** is entitled "Conditions for Impact: An Overview." As the title implies, Chickering seeks to specify those factors in the institutional environment which inhibit or foster development along the lines specified in the first chapter. Chickering stipulates six factors which are critical in the stimulation of development. First, he points out that institutions with clear and consistent objectives are most apt to foster student development. Secondly, he presents data which support his contention that as institutional size increases, institutional impact decreases. Thirdly, he points out that the form of curriculum, teaching and evaluation will affect the degree of institutional impact. Chickering states that curricular inflexibility, reliance on printed material and lecture as the sole or predominant teaching methods, and frequent and competitive evaluation inhibit development. By contrast curricular flexibility, discussion groups, direct experience and substantive, as opposed to competitive, evaluation all serve to foster development. A fourth condition which serves to foster development is the presence of frequent, friendly and varied interaction between faculty and students. A fifth condition for development is residence hall arrangements which foster meaningful and direct interaction between students of diverse backgrounds. The sixth, and perhaps most important, condition for development is the nature of the student culture. The values, attitudes, and backgrounds of the students establish a campus culture through which all other aspects of the college experience are filtered.

The third and final part of Chickering's book consists in the development of two principles which he believes underlie the nature of psychological development. The first principle is stated as "development occurs through cycles of differentiation and integration." Put more simply, the maturation of the individual consists of the recognition of diversity and variations of the social

world which belie the simplistic view of childhood. The task of the adult is to establish a framework which gives meaning and consistency to oneself and one's actions in the face of the world's diversity.

The second principle which Chickering enunciates is "the impact of an experience depends upon the characteristics of the person who encounters it." Chickering is stating the obvious, but usually ignored, fact that students differ and that the educational experience of the student needs to be attuned to the developmental status of the student.

Mr. Chickering concludes **Education and Identity** by suggesting some guidelines for educational policy aimed at fostering student development.

Feldman, Kenneth
College and Student: Selected Readings in the Social Psychology of Higher Education
New York: Pergamon Press, 1972

While this anthology is a self-contained whole, it is not dissimilar in content and scope from Feldman's earlier work with T. Newcomb (see **The Impact of College on Students**, this volume). This eight-part collection of essays touches on a wide array of issues. For our purposes Part Three "Change and Stability During the College Years" and Part Four "Assessing the Influences of Different College Environments" are the most valuable.

Part Three features six essays. In the first article, Lawrence Stewart presents a longitudinal study of a sample of University of California students using three assessment techniques, the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values, the Omni-Bus Personality Inventory and the Strong Vocational Inventory Blank. Lenning, Munday and Maxey attempt to assess "Educational Growth" of students at five colleges during their first two years of college through use of the ACT area tests. A. Chickering reports changes in faculty ratings of students at Goddard College. Becker and Myer, in separate essays, argue that colleges are in fact socializing students rather than "teaching students values." Feldman completes Part Three by describing the difficulties encountered in attempting to measure and interpret the changes in personality and values which take place during the years of college attendance.

Part Four consists of five essays. A. Astin attempts a taxonomy and characterization of 335 colleges and universities using his Environmental Assessment Technique. Skager, Holland and Braskamp demonstrate that changes in students' self-ratings and life goals are correlated with the scores of the institutions on Astin's Environmental Assessment Technique. Berdie uses R. Pace's College and University Environment Scales to demonstrate the multiplicity of environments present in a major environment. Astin examines in

a second article the relationship between undergraduate achievement, "institutional excellence" and the academic ability of the students. The findings of this article are interesting and appear to contravene conventional wisdom.

K. Feldman completes Part Four with an essay on the methodological problems to be found in all attempts to assess the impact of college environments.

The final article of value to be found is Part Five, selection 17, wherein C.W. Huntley describes a longitudinal study of Union College students using the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values.

Feldman, Kenneth and Theodore Newcomb
The Impact of College on Students, two volumes
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969

Feldman and Newcomb's work is the single most comprehensive and informative book available on the subject of the effects of the undergraduate experience. **The Impact of College on Students** is a synthesis and analysis of over 1500 published and unpublished studies of college students and college environments. Thirteen of the studies cited are original pieces by Newcomb and sundry associates. The first volume of the set is essentially a narrative work elucidating the trends uncovered by relevant research. The second volume is a compilation of the results of the cited studies presented in tabular form.

The authors treat a wide variety of subjects including changes in values from freshman to senior year using the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey scale, changes in personality characteristics using a wide variety of instruments, changes in political, social and religious attitudes, the sequence of change during the college years, the varying impacts of differing institutions and major fields of study, the impact of residential arrangements, the relative importance of peer and faculty influence and the stability of changes occurring during the college years.

The authors conclude that students do change significantly during the college years. The prevalent trend is for students to become less authoritarian, less dogmatic, less prejudiced, less attuned to the orthodox forms of religion and less conservative on political and social issues. There is also a somewhat less pronounced trend towards greater intellectual orientation, greater self-confidence and greater impulse-expression. Attitude change which takes place during the college years tends to remain stable during the post-college years.

The authors point out that students tend to "self-select" into institutions and departments which will accentuate latent personality characteristics and intellectual orientations. Thus the degree and nature of the changes which occur are likely to be a function of the personality of the student, the nature of the institutional climate and the field of study chosen. The studies also seem to

demonstrate that the small, residential colleges have the greatest impact on students. Further, while the faculty as individuals may have impact on selected students, their influence as a group seems to be far less than that of the extracurricular institutional environment.

Freedman, Mervin B.
The College Experience
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1967

Mr. Freedman's book is most thought provoking. It attacks a number of theories of adolescent development which are currently in vogue among educators. Freedman argues that important personality change does occur during the college years thus disputing the Freudian contention that personality becomes fixed during childhood. At the same time Freedman takes issue with the view of Erik Erikson that late adolescence is marked by an "identity crisis" which is accompanied by marked emotional upheaval.

Freedman takes a position similar to that of Chickering, arguing that development takes place through increasing differentiation and integration. The college experience can provide the setting for such development.

Mr. Freedman presents a number of studies done at Vassar in support of his contention that personality change occurs during the college years. Pre- and post-tests of students utilizing the Developmental Status Scale, the Impulse Expression Scale, and the Social Maturity Scale provided data which indicate that during the college years students become more independent, more willing to express impulses and less authoritarian. Tests of alumnae indicate that personality changes occurring in college remain stable in later life *with* the exception that alumnae tend to become more conventional and demonstrate less of a tendency towards clinical psychopathology.

Freedman also tested alumnae from the classes of 1904, 1914, 1921-24, 1929-35, 1940-43, and 1956, using the F (authoritarianism) and E (ethnocentrism) scales. His findings indicate that the response of the women to the scales was much marked by the historical epoch in which they lived during the college years. Freeman, like other researchers, makes clear that the college does not operate in a social vacuum and that wider social forces play an enormous role in the development of student values and attitudes.

The College Experience contains a lengthy section on sexuality and sexual practices during the college years. His interviews with Vassar students indicate that there is little evidence of promiscuity among college women. Freedman also notes that the strength of the double standard has been declining among college women, in keeping with wider societal trends.

The College Experience also reports on the perceptions of Vassar women about their life roles. Freedman found that women who sought a career after college tended to be more independent, unconventional and flexible. Freedman points out that in later life the desire of these women for meaningful work is likely to conflict with the alienating nature of work in an industrialized society. Freedman argues that the special problems of women ought to result in a distinctive form of higher education which meets the needs of women.

Freedman concludes with chapters on drugs and student dissidence.

I recommend Freedman's book but with two reservations. First, much of the material is dated having been compiled during the late 1950's and early 1960's. Second, Freedman's studies are of samples of Vassar students and one must be cautious in generalizing from such a narrow population base.

Handlin, Oscar and Mary F. Handlin
The American Colleges and American Culture: Socialization as a Function of Higher Education
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970

This particular book is something of an anomaly in the collection of books presented in this bibliography. Most of the books presented herein are concerned with moral education or student development with relatively little emphasis being given to the historical role of the college as a societal agent. Higher education does not, of course, operate in a social vacuum. Authors of other texts cited in this bibliography (Sanford, 1963; Feldman, 1972; Feldman and Newcomb, 1969; Newcomb, 1967) are careful to point out that wider social forces strongly influence the undergraduate experience. What differentiates this short (85 pages) volume from the others is the historical perspective of the authors.

Handlin and Handlin present the thesis that since the founding of Harvard one of the functions of American colleges has been to serve as a safe and convenient place in which the young might pass from adolescence to adulthood, acquiring along the way the mores and skills which would permit transition to the adult world. In short, a primary function of higher education has been to socialize youth through preparing them for the roles they were to play later in life.

At various points in American history, parents have sent their children to college as a means of ensuring continued adherence to a religious credo, as a center for disciplining wayward youth who had grown beyond the control of parents, as a grooming school where students might acquire a gentlemanly and polished veneer, and as a center for the acquisition of scholarly and technical skills which would ensure future economic and social status.

The thesis that higher education has served as a socializing agent is not original with the Handlins. But I think this is an important book for all the purposes which have been attributed to higher education have been retained, in varying degree, as functions of American higher education. The important point is that those functions of higher education which have been attributed to colleges and universities need to be separated from the philosophical and pedagogical value of any given institutional policy. A reading of the philosophical works which I have included in this bibliography (Beck, Crittenden, & Sullivan, 1971; Carpenter, 1960; Chazan and Soltis, 1973; Dewey, 1975; Green, 1971; Sizer and Sizer, 1970) will serve to buttress the case of those who argue that moral education is of necessity an important component of a complete educational program. Perusal of these texts should also help dissuade the reader from the simplistic notion that moral education consists of the reinforcement of predetermined standards set by parents or other influential sectors of the society. The value of this book by the Handlins is that the historical account contained therein will allow us to see how the current confusion of the complicated business of moral education with the nonintellective process of socialization has occurred.

Heath, Douglas H.
Growing Up in College
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968

Mr. Heath provides us with an excellent study of student development based upon his experiences with the students of Haverford College. As with all such studies, one must be wary of generalizations drawn from studies of the relatively sophisticated population of a liberal arts college such as Haverford.

Mr. Heath presents a model of development, which bears a similarity to that proposed by Chickering (1969).[13] Heath suggests five characteristics of the "mature" individual. First, the mature person has a relatively high capacity for *symbolization.* By symbolization, Heath means the capacity to represent experience symbolically and to place that experience within a conceptual framework.

Second, the mature person is *allocentric*, or "other-directed." Recognizing his common bond with other human beings, the allocentric person is more capable than the immature, egocentric person of demonstrating love, caring, sympathy and a concern for others. The consciously held values of the mature person reflect an allocentric orientation.

Third, the mature person demonstrates a relatively high degree of personal *integration.* The mature person is capable of synthesizing experience, knowledge, emotion, and needs into a meaningful world view.

Fourth, the mature person is more *stable*. The mature person has a set of guiding convictions which, while not immutable, are not subject to easy disruption.

Fifth, the mature person is *autonomous*. The autonomous person is capable of acting conscientiously and independently in the face of social pressures *and* despite his own fears, prejudices and passions.

Heath examines the nature of Haverford as a way of providing a sociocultural setting for his finding. He details the religious-ethical heritage of Haverford, its intellectual tradition, the nature of the student body and the experiences of alumni.

Heath used a variety of instruments in a longitudinal study which attempted to determine the impact of the college. The instrument used included the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values, scales taken from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the Strong Vocational Interest Blank, and four self-report questionnaires designed by Heath. Heath argues that his findings demonstrate that students do mature in the hypothesized fashion during the college years.

Heath also found that alumni and students reported that the factors which most affected their development were roommates, the intellectual atmosphere of the college and courses in English, Psychology and Philosophy.

Heath suggests that the potential developmental impact of the college is dependent upon three factors. First, the degree of congruence which exists between the student's psychological characteristics and the demands of the institution. Second, the degree to which the institution is communal in character. Third, the degree to which the purposes of the institution are coherent and consistent.

Perhaps the most important thesis that Heath advances is what might be termed his "principle of disorganization." Heath argues that the primary catalyst to development is the "disorganization" of the rather narrow and naive world view of the freshman and the opportunity to create and synthesize a new conceptual framework in the context of the intellectual environment of the college. Accordingly, Heath argues that all freshmen should undergo a confrontation with their own values early in the freshman year. Furthermore, Heath contends that seniors should undergo a capstone experience, where a synthesis of their college experience is attempted.

Heath has written this book from the perspective of developmental psychology. However, he does not in any way recommend that the college become an oversized therapy center. To attempt such a transformation would be both unrealistic and a perversion of the fundamentally intellectual purposes of the college. What Heath does argue is that values development and intellectual development are closely linked. The characteristics of honesty, tolerance, flexibility, openness to alternatives, humility, respect for dissenting views, and the capacity for doubt, which are so much associated with the mature person are also personal qualities essential to scholarly endeavor.

Heath, Roy, Foreword by David Riesman
The Reasonable Adventurer
Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964

Dr. Heath's book is the result of a study of thirty-six Princeton undergraduates who were in the class of 1954. Dr. Heath conducted extensive interviews with the thirty-six during their college years. In addition a brief follow-up of the thirty-six students was conducted in 1963. Obviously the study has severe limits as to its generalizability given the population of the study. Moreover, the study does not make use of the more sophisticated evaluative and analytic techniques which have evolved during the last twenty-five years. Nonetheless the study does present some interesting hypotheses.

Dr. Heath proposes a typology of the student population. First, there are those he labels the "noncommitters." This type of student, while generally friendly and amiable, lacks a defined sense of self and of purpose. The noncommitter exhibits an aura of complacency which is a mask for divorcement from serious commitment and involvement in any task.

A second group Dr. Heath calls "the hustlers." These students are committed, but their commitments are unexamined. Their values and goals are largely defined by others. These students lack a capacity for detached self-examination.

The third group is called "the plungers." These students enjoy ideas and are capable of expressing emotion. However, their emotion is not tempered by judgment nor are they consistent in their pursuits. While they are enthusiastic and able, they lack the capacity to integrate their emotions in an intellectual framework.

Dr. Heath proposes the existence of a fourth type of student as an ideal type. This student he labels "the reasonable adventurer." This student has attained a balance between emotion and intellect. The reasonable adventurer recognizes the existence of ambiguity but his capacity for reflective thought allows him to choose a framework of values to which he may commit himself.

Dr. Heath suggests that the differing student psychologies call for differing educational experiences. The noncommitters need to be confronted with the questions they wish to ignore and to be more conscious of the reality of their own emotions. For these students the humanities and the arts might prove eminently useful. The hustlers need to be "shocked" in some fashion so that they are forced to examine the goals they have let others set for them. The plungers in turn need to be forced to demonstrate consistency and the development of a unifying and integrating intellectual framework.

Dr. Heath's work is most interesting in that I suspect many faculty members will recognize the student "types." Unfortunately, Dr. Heath presents no really comprehensive solutions to the educational dilemma he poses.

No Time for Youth, by Joseph Katz and Associates
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969

Katz and his associates conducted a four-year, longitudinal study of 3,500 Berkeley and Stanford students. The study covered a wide range of areas and utilized a diverse set of methodologies. The scope of the text is both a blessing and a handicap in that the wealth of information presented is not placed within the context of a unifying theory of development which would have added coherence to the work.

The concluding chapter by Katz provides some excellent recommendations for educational policy which do serve to tie together the work of he and his several associates. Katz's opening chapter is also helpful in that he enumerates some of the developmental trends which are examined in greater detail in the remainder of the book.

Of most general interest in this work are three chapters written by Harold Korn. Korn examines changes in scores on eight scales drawn from the Omnibus Personality Inventory. Korn examines the difficulties in interpreting the significance of the observed change in scores. Korn expresses the belief that the change in scores may reflect "socialization" rather than significant personality development and that the scales may mask contradictory and ambivalent feelings.

In a second chapter Korn examines the responses of students to the responses of students to the curriculum. He presents data to the effect that what students value in their academic experience (i.e., grades, career utility, or intellectual interest) is related to personality characteristics as measured by elements of the OPI and the California Psychological Inventory. Korn recommends that the curriculum be structured to compensate for personality characteristics which inhibit attainment of the goals of liberal education.

In a third chapter, Korn examines the process of career choice. He notes that his study indicates shifting patterns of vocational interest as expressed in freshman to senior changes. Korn expresses the belief that students are pressured into choosing a career too early in their lives with a resulting loss of opportunities for exploration and development.

Other chapters in the book focus on specific issues. Korn and Madison, in separate chapters, present case studies of student experiences. Marjorie Lozoff addresses the developmental potential of various student residential arrangments. Ving Ellis presents his observations on students who seek psychiatric help. Nevitt Sanford and Susan Singer suggest that the maturation of students is related to their alcohol drinking behavior. Max Levin comments on changes in authoritarianism and observed correlates thereof. Joseph Katz analyzes the Berkeley Free Speech Movement and student activism.

Newcomb, Theodore, Kathryn E. Koenig, Richard Flacks, and Donald P. Warwick;
Persistence and Change: Bennington College and Its Students after 25 Years
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967

Persistence and Change provides some welcome evidence on the retention of attitudes and values acquired during the college years. The studies reported in this book nad two essential foci. The first consisted of a reassessment of Bennington students who had graduated in 1938, 1939, and 1940 and who had participated in the original study by Newcomb. The second focus of the study was a comparison of the Bennington community of 1959 through 1962 with that of the 1930's.

The study made use of a variety of questionnaires which sought to assess the socioeconomic characteristics of the subject population, the political beliefs of students and alumnae, community norms, and personality characteristics of the students. The instruments were primarily of the self-report variety in addition to scales taken from the Omnibus Personality Inventory.

The authors concluded that basic attitudes and values which had been acquired during the college years had remained stable. Graduates of the 1930's tended to retain the basic world view (e.g., conservative or liberal) which had crystallized during the college years. The persistence of attitudes was attributed by the authors both to the influence of the college and the creation, by the graduates, of supportive environments through their selection of friends, spouses, and careers.

The authors' examination of the Bennington communities of the 1930's and the early 1960's revealed that the community norms of individualism, intellectuality, and unconventionality had remained relatively stable over a twenty-five year period.

The authors point out that during the twenty-five-year span covered by this report the ethos and reputation of Bennington had crystallized. The consequence of establishing a particular reputation was to foster the self-selection of liberal, nonconventional students into the college. Thus the nature of the college's impact shifted from one of "conversion" of the conventional students to "accentuation" of the personality characteristics of entering students.

Perry, William G.
Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years: A Scheme
New York: Holt-Rinehart Winston, 1970

Mr. Perry presents us with a very interesting hypothesis on the nature of student development during the college years. The study is based upon interviews of Harvard and Radcliffe students during the years 1954 through 1963. A total of 140 students were the subjects of the study, 84 of whom were subject to recurring interviews over the four-year span of their undergraduate experience.

While there are methodological limitations to the study, which are recognized by Mr. Perry, his observations and conclusions are buttressed by their commonality with the work of a number of developmental psychologists such as Piaget, Erikson, Lewin and Allport.

Perry proposes a scheme of nine "stages" of development. Each succeeding stage presents a more complex and differentiated mechanism for handling perceived theoretical and factual contradictions. Each stage provides a more effective mechanism for reconciling dissonant perceptions.

The nine stages may be grouped into three phases: dualism, relativism and commitment. In the dualistic phase there is a tendency to see the world painted in absolutes, right vs. wrong, truth vs. falsehood. Absolute truths are presumed to exist and strong faith is placed in pronouncements from "authorities."

In the relativistic phase there is a clearer recognition of ambiguity and of the potential for differing and/or conflicting explanations. What is lacking is a critical spirit. Relativism and acknowledgement of alternatives become absolutes in their own right. Judgment is suspended and regarded with skepticism because "everything is relative." Life may become divided into those areas in which "the truth" may be known (e.g., the natural sciences) and those areas which defy human judgment (e.g., ethics and religion).

In the commitment phase, the student develops the capacity to make choices. While cognizant and tolerant of alternatives the student learns to make meaningful decisions based upon the best information open to him or her. Commitments of personal style, philosophy and identity are made in this phase. There is also a recognition of the limits of reason.

The stages are not, of course, absolute. Mr. Perry points to a number of mechanisms which result in stage fixation or regression.

Despite the methodological limitations of the study, an intriguing and well-thought-out theory is presented which makes this book well worth reading.

Sanford, Nevitt (ed.)
The American College
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962

Almost any attempt to review or describe this enormous collection would inevitably fall short. It stands, with Feldman and Newcomb's **The Impact of College on Students**, as the most comprehensive single volume on the nature of the American college as a social and educational institution. Nevitt Sanford describes the purpose of **The American College** as an attempt "... to apply modern social and personality theory to an analysis of the structures and processes of American undergraduate education, and to organize large amounts of empirical information within the same theoretical framework, in a form useful to practice" (pg. vii). In this attempt the authors of **The American College** have succeeeded admirably.

The American College contains twenty-nine separate chapters and a chronicling of their contents would not be useful for our purposes. However, a brief description of the thrust of each of the major sections of the book may be in order.

Section I outlines the issues to be raised in the remainder of the book and provides a characterization of the college as a social institution. Section II focuses on the characteristics and diversity of the entering student. Section III provides theoretical and empirical perspectives on teaching, curriculum and the professoriate. Section IV examines the nature and impact of the student culture. Section V centers on the progress, or lack thereof, of students in relation to educational objectives. Section VI examines the nature of the interaction between students and staff. Section VII reports research on changes in the values and attitudes of students and persistence of such changes in later life. Section VIII provides a historical and theoretical analysis of the interaction between higher education and the larger society.

For the purposes of this bibliography, Section VII is of the most immediate value. The conclusions of the authors of the two chapters are similar to that of Feldman and Newcomb (1969). The authors conclude that freshman to senior changes do occur, taking the form of increasing liberalization of social, political and religious views, increased tolerance and declining authoritarianism. The authors also report significant changes on responses to various OPI scales. Mervin Freedman, who wrote the second chapter of this section, goes on to report studies which indicate that personality changes which occur in college remain stable over long periods of time.

The American College is dated in some respects and much more evidence has been accumulated on the social and psychological effects of the college experience. Nonetheless, **The American College** remains an invaluable contribution to the literature of higher education.

Trent, James W. and Leland Medsker
Beyond High School
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969

One of the issues which has troubled researchers who have sought to assess the impact of college has been the need to distinguish between those effects which may be attributed to the college experience and those patterns of development which are common to youth generally in our society. To note that the values of college youths change during four years says little about the effect of college unless individuals who do not attend college do not exhibit a like developmental pattern.

Trent and Medsker's study is quite helpful in attempting to resolve this dilemma. The authors followed the life careers of 10,000 high school graduates for a four-year period. They distinguished in their sample between those who persisted in college for the four years, those who withdrew, those who withdrew and eventually returned to college and those who entered employment or homemaking shortly after graduating from high school. The study spanned the years 1959 to 1963.

The first half of the book examines patterns of employment among those who did not attend college, patterns of movement in and out of college, and factors associated with persistence in college for four years.

The second half of the book focuses on the differing experiences of the college attenders and nonattenders. Trent and Medsker used three basic assessment devices in their study. These included five scales taken from the Omnibus Personality Inventory, the School and College Ability Test, which was used to measure academic aptitude, and the Student Questionnaire which elicited responses on a wide variety of topics, including occupational and educational goals, socioeconomic background, and attitudes of parents.

The data reported indicate that though there was a general trend of positive development, the development was far more pronounced among those who then the employed and least of all among the homemakers. The homemakers and the employed exhibited regression on some scales. Of all the changes the most remarkable was the growth of the college persisters in autonomy as compared with other groups.

In attempting to ascertain the factors associated with the change, Trent and Medsker divided the sample into three groups: those whose scores changed exceptionally in a positive direction, the "average changers," and those who regressed on the scales. The authors concluded that the exceptional changers were distinguished by the greatest degree of academic ability, and family environments which most valued education and liberal religious beliefs. Their study seems to corroborate the hypothesis of Feldman and Newcomb[14] that the

primary effect of college is to release latent potentials for personality development. Colleges do not "create" new values but serve to accentuate and reinforce certain values when a state of psychological "readiness" exists.

This book is well recommended for it is broad in scope and careful in its conclusions.

Yamomoto, Kaoru (ed.)
The College Student and His Culture: An Analysis
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968

This anthology is much in the style of Kenneth Feldman's **College & Student**. The book is divided into sections, each of which attempts an analysis of a different facet of the college experience. Feldman's book contains more recent research, but many of the essays in Yamomoto's collection are of historic interest.

Part I presents an overview of the American college. Part II provides an examination of the diverse student population attending American colleges. Part III focuses on the nature of the student culture. Part V focuses on dropouts and graduate study in separate sections. Part VI examines the advent of mass higher education.

Of most interest for our purposes is Part IV which examines the impact of college on students. Section A of Part IV presents three articles on the changes in values of students during the college years. The first essay is an excerpt from Phillip Jacob's famous book, **Changing Values in College**. Jacob concluded that the overwhelming majority of students emerged from college with a complacent, uncritical acceptance of traditional, materialistic values. He does say that certain small colleges with distinctive climates do have an impact on students' values. The second essay, by John Smith, offers a commentary on the concept of "values education." The third essay, by Allen Barton, presents a devastating critique of the methodology used in the Jacob study, and concludes that Jacob's conclusions are no more than untested hypotheses.

Section B of Part IV consists of four essays focusing on the problems students face in adjusting to the college environment. One of the articles is an excerpt from Roy Heath's **The Reasonable Adventurer** which is annotated elsewhere in this bibliography.

Section C of Part IV presents several studies of personality changes in college students. In separate articles, Lawrence Stewart and Irving Lehman present evidence, using a wide array of personality assessment technique, which demonstrates significant change during the college years. However, Walter Plant and Charles Telford, in their article, report that though changes were evident in

their study of six California junior colleges, similar changes were evident in nonattenders. For an extensive study of the unique effects of college, see Trent and Medsker's **Beyond High School**, which is annotated elsewhere in this bibliography. Section C concludes with a reprinting of the final chapter of Edward Eddy's book, **The College Influence on Student Character**.

The College Student and His Culture raises many important issues and presents some interesting studies. However, this book needs to read in conjunction with reports of more recent research.

SECTION C

PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Carpenter, Marjorie (ed.)
The Larger Learning: Teaching Values to College Students
Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown, 1960

This collection of essays is one of many texts inspired by Phillip Jacob's **Changing Values in College**. The late 1950's and early 1960's saw a rash of such publications. The text is dated but retains a good deal of interest and value.

The opening essay is by Huston Smith who defends the place of values education in the curriculum. Smith argues further that many values held sacred in the academic society are also important human values which may be legitimately impressed upon students.

Marjorie Carpenter reviews existing practices in values education and discusses the role of the various liberal arts disciplines in values education.

Thomas Steele, in his essay, suggests a way in which biology might serve as a focus for the discussion of a number of important value issues.

John Bushnell offers a critique of **Changing Values in College**, reviews a number of then current studies, and suggests directions for future research.

The concluding essay by Lewis Mayhew examines the major conceptual approaches to values education. Mayhew goes on to suggest a number of elements essential to the implementation of an effective values education program.

C.M. Beck, B.S. Crittenden, and E.V. Sullivan
Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches
University of Toronto Press (U.S.A., Paulist Press), 1971

In 1968 the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education sponsored a conference on moral education. A number of the more prominent figures in the field of moral education were invited to participate for the twofold purpose of presenting papers and engaging in a discussion of some of the more important issues in moral education.

Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches is a report on the proceedings of the conference. This collection of essays by psychologists, sociologists and philosophers is one of the most informative and sophisticated introductions to the field of moral education available. The essays and discussions in this work are not unduly technical yet they provide an insight into the major theories of moral development and the attendant philosophical problems.

The book is divided into five parts, the first four of which are composed of nine essays. L. Kohlberg describes his cognitive-developmental theory and also argues that the psychological theory of moral development he presents provides an adequate philosophical base for programs in moral education. Kohlberg's theory of moral development is the subject of a critique by J. Aronfreed who argues from a social learning theory perspective. D.P. Ausubel argues in turn that modern psychology has "undervalued" the human capacity for rational decision making. Ausubel claims that psychology's overemphasis on the affective dimension has lent credence to the philosophically unjustifiable position of ethical relativism. J. Loubser takes a sociological approach to the problem of moral development and hypothesizes on some of the effects of the social organization of the school. K. Baier's essay attempts to reconcile the apparent conflict between acceptance of ethical pluralism and moral education by suggesting some broad and universally applicable goals of any program of moral education. A.I. Melden and D.P. Gauthier in their separate essays comment on the relationship between moral action and moral education by attempting to define the nature of moral action.

D.W. Oliver and M.J. Bane outline in their essay what they believe to be essential components of the process of moral justification and the relevance of the process for classroom discussion. D.E. Hunt, relying upon the work of G.G. Stern, K. Lewin and L. Kohlberg, argues that schools and curricula must be structured so that they are congruent with the developmental stage and needs of the students.

In the fifth and final part of the book, an edited transcript of discussions by the participants is presented. The topics of discussion include the meaning of "moral," the process and content of programs of moral education, Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development and the relative importance of the cognitive and the affective elements of moral reasoning and moral behavior.

Chazan, Barry I., and Jonas F. Soltis
Moral Education
New York: Teachers College Press, 1973

This useful anthology is part of the Problems in Education series sponsored by Columbia University's Teachers College. Like the other philosophical works included in this bibliography, I hope that the writings will help clarify the issues which are so often muddled in much of the current discourse surrounding moral or "values" education. The primary purposes of the book are to apply philosophic methods to the problem of moral education and to attempt to indicate the role of moral philosophy in moral education.

The first part of the book attempts to elucidate the nature of moral philosophy and the moral situation. W.K. Frankena provides the first essay in which he describes the nature of moral philosophy. This essay is drawn from Frankena's **Ethics**, which is an excellent little introduction to moral philosophy. Soltis follows Frankena's essay with an attempt to describe the nature of these situations which may be termed moral situations, i.e., matters which require moral choice. Soltis concludes that, in fact, the moral situation, per se, may not be defined without assuming some particular ethic. What Soltis says may be true, but I suspect that for moral education the implications of his thesis are limited. Moral education might begin with an attempt to separate out issues which call for moral judgments. However, the more pressing issues for moral education involve normative judgments and consequent action. Chazan takes up Soltis' challenge to establish formal criteria for the moral situation by construing the moral situation as one in which the individual makes a judgment which is "a universal prescription for behavior" which requires justification.

The second part of the anthology presents some of the more common forms of theories of ethical justification. P. Phenix begins this section by postulating that ethics must be rooted in the reality of an ideal order, i.e., the nature of God provides the basis of ethics. Phenix's theological base removes him, of course, from the dialogue of most of Western philosophy. Unless he can empirically or logically demonstrate the presence of an omniscient God, his ethical justification remains a matter of faith and not reason.

Phenix's essay is followed by a short passage drawn from G.E. Moore's **Principia Ethica**. Moore contends that "good" cannot be defined, as "good" is a primary property much like the color yellow. Just as we cannot define the color yellow without seeing it, so we cannot define good without simple perception. As a consequence, Moore believes that we simply intuit the property of "goodness" from objects, situations, and persons. The problem with Moore's argument, of course, is that the existence of this universal, intuitive perception of "good" is extremely difficult to demonstrate.

The third article in this section is by Sidney Morgenbesser. Morgenbesser contends that the objective base for ethics lies in the ability of human beings to voluntarily come to a consensus on the attitudes and behavior appropriate to a given situation. This theory presumes that, under the rules of logic and given the presentation of the same evidence to all parties, agreement can be reached as to the appropriate response to a given situation. The flaw in the theory, of course, is the presumption of consensus. No criterion exists in the event of disagreement. Morgenbesser's contribution, however, is important to the philosophy of education where the presentation of evidence and the consideration of alternative lie at the heart of successful education.

This second section concludes with a passage drawn from Jean-Paul Sartre's **Existentialism**. Sartre contends that no objective moral order exists or can exist. He contends that the ultimate nature of morality lies in the power of choice which every human has. Through choice, the individual creates his morality.

Drawing from Kant, Sartre stipulates that the process of choice also logically entails the willingness to universalize the choices which the individual makes. Sartre goes on to say that most moral philosophy is useless as it provides no guide to conduct in cases where moral duties conflict.

Part three of this book offers two essays, each of which explores the role and nature of moral principles in moral education. The first is by R.M. Hare. In this essay, which he expands in an essay to be found in part four, Hare contends that the essence of moral education consists of instilling the principle that conduct requires justification by moral principles. Marcus Singer, in his essay, draws a distinction between moral principles and moral rules, which is much like the distinction between the spirit and the letter of the law. Singer also offers a critique of ethical relativism.

Part four of **Moral Education** presents three essays on the nature of the morally autonomous person. R.M. Hare, as noted earlier, stresses the need for decisions of principle. J. Wilson describes the components of behavior, attitude and thought which make up the morally autonomous man. The "Farmington Man," as Wilson's moral creature has been called, has received widespread attention and is worth at least a cursory examination. Part four concludes with an essay by L. Kohlberg in which he describes his stage theory of moral development. Kohlberg's theory is summarized elsewhere in this bibliography.

Part five examines the relationship between teaching and morality. William Frankena's essay, which begins this last section, attempts definition of the nature of education. Successful moral education, Frankena concludes, consists of developing in the student a "global sense of moral self-directedness" and such dispositions as "integrity, self-control and readiness" which provide the will to act.

The second article, by R.D. Archmbault, is quite interesting. Drawing upon Israel Scheffler's **Language and Education**, Archmbault attempts to set criteria for success in moral education. Archmbault sets as the aims of moral instruction "intellectual commitment to norms, reflection and criticisms of norms held; inculcation and promotion of the methods of objective criticism and evaluation which in itself represents an important form of moral activity" (pg. 166). Archmbault's essay is well worth reading.

The fifth section concludes with a passage from **Values & Teaching** by L. Raths, M. Harmin and S. Simon in which they present their "values-clarification" approach to moral education.

The book concludes with a valuable bibliographical note.

Dewey, John
Moral Principles in Education
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975

This little volume by Dewey remains one of the most cogent and incisive commentaries on moral education which this writer has ever read. However, it would be a mistake to read this book without also reading Dewey's other works, particularly **Democracy and Education** and **Theory of the Moral Life**, which provide a background in the eductional and moral philosophy underlying **Moral Principles in Education**.

The foremost principle espoused by Dewey in this work is the need to integrate moral education with the total educational experience of the student. Arguing that what we term morality is in fact the means by which we regulate our social interchange, Dewey contends that the essence of moral education consists of the application and development of the student's social powers. If education is, as Dewey contends in **Democracy and Education**, preparation for social life, then the most effective means of moral education is to transform the school into a society in micro, wherein the student is placed in the position of a responsible member of the society. The more the student is confronted with his or her rights and responsibilities, through active participation in the life of the community, the deeper will be his or her understanding and appreciation of the rules of social interchange. [illegible] to the extent that the society is democratic the student will develop the powers of self-direction and leadership through participation in the creation of the rules which govern the society.

Dewey argues further that coursework or educational experiences which have as their aim moral education are futile efforts insofar as they are encapsulated apart from the experience of the student and the social significance of the various components of the curriculum. We smile at the notion of courses entitled "Beginning Virtue," "Intermediate Virtue," and "Advanced Virtue." Yet, we do seem to expect some magical change in the conduct and behavior of youth through courses entitled Ethics 101 or Religion 203.

A more effective form of moral education, according to Dewey, is to bring out the social significance of the subjects which form the heart of the curriculum, whether the subject be history, political science, or mathematics. Dewey gives as an example the subject of geography. From a moral point of view, the purpose of teaching geography is not the memorization of rivers, mountain ranges and capitals, but the recognition of the political, social, and geographic boundaries which have had an impact upon the social organization of the affected populace. Those same boundaries are also those across which flow human interchange, whether that interchange be social, cultural, economic, or political. The organization and substance of that interchange are the proper subject of moral education.

Dewey also decries attempts at moral education which are essentially proscriptive. Such efforts he describes as being both nonintellective and pathological. The latter term Dewey uses in the belief that proscriptive training focuses upon habits of wrongdoing rather than on educating for public service.

Dewey's principles offer much that is of value to educators. Certainly application of his principles would do much to improve current efforts at "values education." One flaw in his work, however, is that pointed out by Sidney Hook in his preface to the 1975 edition. Dewey does not offer any suggestions as to how educators may foster what is termed "strength of character," the ability to remain committed to one's moral values despite unpopularity of outside. For an insight into this problem, we must turn to the efforts of more contemporary psychologists. The work of Jane Loevinger[15] on the development of "ego-strength" is worth further exploration by the reader in this regard.

Green, Thomas
The Activities of Teaching
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971

This volume is in the tradition of Scheffler's **Language and Education**. Green applies the techniques and methodology of linguistic analysis to the concept of teaching. While Mr. Green does not address the issue of moral education in his book, I nonetheless think that his analysis of teaching is of utmost importance to an understanding of the nature of moral education.

Mr. Green raises the educational questions which are of critical importance. How may we distinguish between education and indoctrination? What is the role of education in transforming belief systems? What is the relationship between knowledge and belief? Is truth absolute or relative? Are "judgments of value" and "judgments of taste" equivalent expressions?

Mr. Green offers no easy answers to these questions. In many instances the major value of his analysis is to clarify the issues involved. But there is a single thread which seems to run throughout the book.

Each process examined by Green may be distinguished by the degree and nature of the evidence marshalled by the teacher and/or the student. Thus indoctrination differs from instructing in that indoctrinating attempts to instill belief without respect for either the reason of the student or consideration of relevant evidence. Judgments of value differ from judgments of taste in that judgments of value are posed with reference to some standard whereas judgments of taste are merely expressions of feeling.

Unlike many works of philosophy, Mr. Green's book is written in a clear and lucid style. I think any program of moral education would need to explore the questions raised in this provocative book and I heartily recommend **The Activities of Teaching** as a guide to the exploration of those questions.

Lerner, Max
Values in Education
Bloomington: Phi Delta Kappa, 1976

This bibliography is almost wholely composed of the writings of specialists, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists; each writing from the perspective of their own discipline. I have deliberately avoided the writings of educational "generalists" on the gounds that the complex questions of moral education require greater sophistication and expertise than the superficial consideration to which they are generally subject.

However, this book by Max Lerner is often so perceptive in his analysis that I think this book provides a valuable conceptual framework for further exploration of values education.

There are a number of valuable insights in this book, not the least of which is his analysis of the ambivalent American attitude towards values education. Lerner contends that it is idiotic to debate whether or not one should engage in values education. By its very nature education is, to use Lerner's phrase, "values drenched." However, Lerner does understand the historical roots of our ambivalence. First, political, religious, and sectional sectarianism has tainted attempts at values education. Secondly, the home and the church have been regarded as the center for values formation and educators have been reluctant to come into conflict with the prerogatives of these two institutions. Thirdly, the "pragmatic" concern for preparing students for the marketplace has overriden other concerns. Finally, the misuse and abuse of progressive education theory in the form of "life adjustment education" brought values education into disrepute.

Lerner goes on to postulate a set of fundamental human needs, the fulfillment of which necessitates a choice of guiding values. He points out further that the search for guiding values continues sporadically throughout the life span. It has been a fundamental error of American education to assume some end point to development, to define "grown-up" as something apart from "growing."

Lerner examines a number of theoretical approaches to education within the context of the clusters of human needs which he has postulated. His critique of James and Dewey is valuable, though I think unduly harsh. He also discusses briefly the major schools of psychology and the potential uses and drawbacks of each school.

Lerner's analysis of the societal conflicts over education is perceptive, insofar as it goes. Lerner argues that the major battle has been between the liberalism of the intellectual elite and the upper middle class on the one hand against the basic conservatism of the blue-collar and middle-class white-collar worker on the other hand. Lerner's analysis is useful in come places, but on the whole, I think the analysis much too shallow.

Lerner's concluding section is very valuable. Lerner contends that what has endured from the tumult of the 1960's is less the political activism than a set of cultural values which had an important impact on the young. Lerner contends that these new values are moving into a cultural void left by the pace and nature of social change. The Lerner's thesis is that the fundamental value problems which will face the next generation is to find a melding of the humane values of the counter-culture with the productive aspects of the dominant technological culture.

> "The bind lies in the still unresolved tension between polar values: to work hard *and* to be casual; to make a living *and* to make a life; to reject materialism *and* to affort travel, technology, and gadgetry; to be free for personal growth *and* to raise children as well; to be open to adventure *and* to be committed to continuing love and family loyalties; to care for country . . . *and* to be a citizen of the world; to explore new modes of consciousness and awareness *and* to continue embracing the everyday pragmatisms of life."

Lerner's insight is, I think, extraordinary in this matter. I think the college would do well to focus on these polar tensions as they seek to construct programs of values education.

Moral Development: Proceedings of the 1974 ETS Invitational Conference
Princeton: Educational Testing Service, 1974

This short collection of essays is interesting in the diversity of views presented and as an exemplar of the variety of motives and goals which animate the current interest in moral education.

The collection begins with an essay by Irving Kristol. Kristol argues vehemently that our social institutions, including education, need to reassert their moral authority if they are to regain legitimacy in the eyes of the general public and the special constituencies which they serve.

Kristol's essay is followed by that of Martin Trow which, I think, is the most valuable of the six essays presented in this volume. Trow suggests three areas of the collegiate experience which can affect the development of the student. First is the content of the curriculum which can provide knowledge and insights which are essential to moral choice; second, the method of inquiry fostered by the academic society. Scholarship, contends Trow, entails a number of important values such as the search for truth, objectivity, and respect for dissenting views. The third source of development suggested by Trow is the moral influence of the teacher. Trow contends that as a model the teacher can positively affect the moral development of the student. Trow cautions, however, against transforming the teacher as model into the teacher as guru.

Murray Schwartz contributes an article on the ethical dilemma facing lawyers and legal education. Are lawyers to be trained as advocates, leaving decisions of guilt and innocence to the judicial system, or are they bound to an ethical system which transcends, and potentially conflicts with their obligations to the client? Schwartz offers no pat answers, but he does lucidly define the problem.

Gunnar Myrdal's essay is on education in the underdeveloped countries. Myrdal contends that the educational system of many such countries is immoral. By restricting meaningful and appropriate education to a small minority the educational system serves to perpetuate poverty and the social dominance of an elite.

Jane Loevinger's essay focuses on the problem of measuring moral development. Loevinger points out that one's model of moral development tends to direct one's method of assessment. Loevinger contrasts several developmental models including those of Piaget, Kohlberg, and her own ego-developmental model.

Wilson Riles brings the volume to a conclusion with an essay on the role of the schools in moral development. Riles contends that schools do have a responsibility for moral education and that moral education is best fostered through integration with other facets of the curriculum and the life experiences of the student.

Scheffler, Israel
The Language of Education
Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1960

Mr. Scheffler's book is one of the first major attempts to apply the techniques of linguistic analysis to educational discourse. Mr. Scheffler attempts an analysis of such topics as definitions in education, educational slogans, and educational metaphors, seeking in each instance to clarify their nature and uses. Given the often hortatory and muddy nature of educational discourse ("values education," "community-based education," "student-centered education," "education as growth," etc.), Scheffler's crisp analysis of educational terminology is most welcome and heartily recommended.

However, it is the second half of his book and his analysis of the concept of teaching which is of most interest for the purposes of this bibliography.

Teaching, contends Scheffler, is distinguished from other modes of fostering behavior and belief chiefly by the manner in which teaching seeks to achieve its aims. To teach, says Scheffler, "[is] to acknowledge the reason of the pupil, i.e., his demand for and judgment of reasons, even though such demands are not uniformly appropriate at every phase of the teaching interval" (pg. 58).

The problem with much of what is termed "moral education" is that it places little or no emphasis on the independent rational judgment of the student.

Rather the specific attitudes and behaviors with which we wish the student to emerge are specified beforehand, without regard to the critical judgment of the student. To be sure, there are certain types of behavior, such as certain safety practices, for which the establishment of an elaborate rationale would be inappropriate. However, as Scheffler points out, the essentially *moral* element in moral behavior is the disinterested rational support of norms of conduct. To quote Scheffler, "If moral conduct is our goal in moral education, we are, in effect, striving to achieve not alone the acquisition of norms of a given sort in practice, but the reflective support of norms of this sort in an "objective" or "impartial" manner (pg. 95).

To encourage critical judgment means that educators cannot specify, a priori, the attitudes and behaviors of the student. We must be prepared for the prospect that students will differ with the views of the teacher and the school. To quote Scheffler again, "To encourage a *reflective and impartial* critique of norms may lead to a rejection of *our* norms" (pg. 95).

Scheffler makes one other point which is of immediate interest. How do we determine success in moral education? The answer to this question, says Scheffler, lies in our interpretation of the nature of moral instruction. If we apply a *nonactive* interpretation, we might suppose that instruction has been successful when the student indicates belief in a given norm, and, we may suppose, is able to provide a plausible rationale for that belief. The problem with the nonactive interpretation, according to Scheffler, is that success in moral education becomes reduced to vacuous "verbalisms" as evidence is not required of behavioral manifestations of the norm.

However, if one adopts the *active* interpretation of success in moral education then the criteria would include the acquisition of the norm and evidence of a tendency to behave in accord with the norm. Thus Scheffler, like William Frankena, argues that moral education needs to encompass the encouragement of both critical judgment and behavior in accord with those judgments.

Scheffler does not, of course, tell us how we might bridge the gap between belief and behavior. For resolution of this problem, we must turn to the psychologists. Scheffler has provided us, however, with a most valuable definition of the nature of teaching and success in moral education.

Sizer, Nancy F. and Theodore R. Sizer (eds.)
Moral Education: Five Lectures
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970

The short collection of essays by James Gufstafson, R.S. Peters, Lawrence Kohlberg, Bruno Bettelheim and Kenneth Keniston is philosophical in intent and content. The essays seek to establish goals for moral education in the light of psychological theory and current social trends.

Gufstafson outlines what he believes to be the "salient aspects" of moral action. It is these "aspects" which Gufstafson contends should be the focus of moral education. Gufstafson also comments on the relationship between religious and moral education.

R.S. Peters argues that there are a number of "fundamental but nonarbitrary" moral principles which are necessary elements of moral reasoning. Peters contends that handing out detailed moral codes is an ineffective method of preparing students to deal with complex situations. Rather, moral education should consist of consideration of certain concrete principles, such as impartiality, the consideration of interests, respect for persons, and freedom, which serve as the guidelines and criterion for a rational process of moral choice.

Kohlberg's essay is more than faintly reminiscent of John Dewey and John Rawls. Kohlberg argues that justice is the central and unifying principle of ethical theory and hence should form the basis of programs of moral education. Kohlberg's definition of justice is much like that of Rawls. Kohlberg further claims that the endpoint of the developmental hierarchy of moral thought, which he postulates as the "natural" form of moral development, represents a structured mode of thought which closely resembles that reflected in Rawls' theory of justice. More succinctly, Kohlberg claims that his psychological theory of moral development is also adequate as a philosophic base upon which to build programs of moral education.

Bruno Betteleheim focuses his essay on what he sees as an inadequate understanding of moral psychology. Bettelheim points to a number of tenets of neo-Freudian psychology which he contends have been virtually ignored in programs of moral education. Bettelheim argues that the psychological principles he describes must serve as the theoretical foundation for an effective program of moral education.

Keniston's essay is a sketch of what he believes to be the social forces which are shaping the values of the young. Keniston suggests that the effect of a pluralizing, rapidly changing, highly technological culture has been to produce a generation which is skeptical of the value of technology, sensuous in its life-style, places great value on interpersonal relationships and a sense of community, is impatient with learning which is unconnected with action and abhors violence. Keniston believes that the fear of violence, in all its many forms, is the most singular aspect of the psychology of contemporary youth. Given the premise of the centrality of violence in the experience of the young, Keniston suggests that the task of moral education is to help the young find constructive ways to curb and channel the potential for destruction and violence.

Stephenson, John B. and Robert F. Sexton
"Experiential Education and the Revitalization of the Liberal Arts" printed in **The Philosophy of the Curriculum: The Need for General Education**, edited by Sidney Hook, Paul Kurtz, and Miro Todorovich, Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1975.

One of the admitted shortcomings of this bibliography is that it offers very little in the way of reports of educational experiments in moral education. I hope to rectify this failure by recounting an experiment undertaken at the University of Kentucky. I have chosen this particular experiment as it represents one of the finest attempts I know of to operationalize the philosophical and psychological principles which are developed by other writers cited in this bibliography.

"Experiential Education . . . " provides the rationale for the program at the University of Kentucky which I will describe briefly later in this annotation.

Stephenson and Sexton begin with the premise that "the liberal arts provide a means for the individual to understand his or her relationship to the larger environment." Much like Dewey, Stephenson and Sexton see the purpose of education as preparation for life in the social environment. They go on to note some of the familiar circumstances confronting higher education; confusion of purpose, the advent of "the new learners," increased vocationalism, and the pressure for accountability.

It is the latter part of their essay which is of most interest to us. Stephenson and Sexton make two basic points in their essay. First they decry what might be termed "passive learning." They call for the immersion of the student in a learning environment which "permit(s) the student to become an integral part of the institution or learning environment, hopefully performing real work with real value in a manner similar to other nonstudent participants in this environment. This immersion is important, because simple observation, that is, from the periphery of the environment, might not be enough to help the learner understand the inner or hidden meanings, the cues that reflect real versus superficial activity" (pg. 184). The thrust of experiential education, as perceived by Stephenson and Sexton, is to move away from reliance on transmission of material from instructor to student and towards reliance on the motivation and interests of the student and the capacity of the student to meaningfully integrate educational experiences.

Now it should be noted that though the authors are proponents of experiential education, they in no way seek to denigrate the value of theory, which is, after all, at the heart of the academic enterprise. Here we come to the second thesis of the essay. The authors are seeking to end the dichotomy between theory and practice. Like Kant, they believe that nothing is so practical as a good theory. What they hope to accomplish through experiential education

is to give students "hooks" of practice upon which to hang the tenets of theory.

The practical outcome of the rationale proposed by Stephenson and Sexton has been the course "Values in Public Decision-Making" at the University of Kentucky. The course has three major themes. First, consideration of the problems of institutionalization and bureaucratization in American politics. Second, problems of moral value emanating from the creation of the state. Third, consideration of the social and psychological impacts of functioning within a major institution.

The course has two major components. The first consists of a student internship in a state or local government agency. The object of this component is to place the student in a situation where the potential for moral conflict exists through confrontation with the realities of institutional and governmental politics. This component of the course is based on the work of Lawrence Kohlberg and William Perry, both of whom have postulated the theory that confrontation with ethical dilemmas is the key to moral development. The second component of the course consists of a seminar which has a twofold thrust. First, the seminar is an area for discussion of the concerns and ideas engendered by the internship. Second, the seminar provides a background in social, moral and political philosophy, through the reading and discussion of the writings of numerous individuals, including those of John Rawls, Peter Berger, Robert Nozick, Paul Douglas, Paul Goodman, and Clinton Collins. Essentially, the seminar is designed to serve as a substantive, integrative and reflective base for the experience of the internship.

The University of Kentucky experiment demonstrates admirably how a coherent and empirically based educational theory may be operationalized in an educational program.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Blatt, M., A. Colby, and B. Speicher, **Hypothetical Dilemmas for Use in Moral Discussions,** Cambridge, Moral Education and Research Foundation, 1974.

2. See Perry, W.G., **Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development During the College Years,** annotated in this bibliography.

3. Kohlberg cites these two studies but does not provide a complete reference, nor are these studies cited in the **Education Index.** They may be unpublished manuscripts available through Kohlberg or the authors.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Podd, M.H., "Ego Identity Status and Morality: An Empirical Investigation of Two Developmental Concepts," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1969.

6. "Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development," **Human Development** 12 (1969): 93-120.

7. "Stage Transition in Moral Development," **Second Handbook of Research on Teaching.**

R. Travers (ed.), Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973.

8. Maslow, A., **Motivation and Personality,** New York: Harper and Row, 1954.

9. Annotated in this bibliography.

10. Sullivan, E.V., McCullough, G., and M.A. Stager, "A Developmental Study of the Relationship Between Conceptual, Ego, and Moral Development," **Child Development,** 1970, 41(2): 399-411.

11. See L. Kohlberg's "Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development" in this bibliography.

12. There have been efforts to effect a reproachment between these two schools of thought. See, for example, Aronfreed's essay in **Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues;** T. Lockona (ed.).

13. See **Education and Identity,** annotated in this bibliography.

14. See **The Impact of College on Students,** annotated in this bibliography.

15. See Loevinger, J., "The Meaning and Measurement of Ego Development," **American Psychology** (1966) 195-206.